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Something about the mind and how it relates to the body, or (how mental properties are related 
to physical properties) seems to present with an unusually difficult problem. When one 
focusses on the mental property of consciousness for instance, one could ask the question: 
what exactly is consciousness, and how does it relate to the brain and the body? (Robinson, 
2016). This is what leads us to the purpose of this paper. As the complexity of these issues 
started to grow over the years, more and more philosophical theories started to emerge with 
the hope of providing some sort of a basic conception of mind (Heil, 2004). These basic 
conceptions then formed the traditional frameworks within the mind-body problem, which to 
this day serve as the foundations from which other ideologies and theories are constructed. 
There have been a number of varying theories that have circulated and been reconstructed over 
the years, however the most prevalent of these traditional theories are Dualism and 
Materialism/Physicalism.   
However, as popularly supported and debated as these theories might be, both appear to face 
serious problems that have debilitated them beyond repair to this day. Due to their continuous 
struggle in trying to provide sufficient solutions, a plateau was reached in terms of what could 
be done with these traditional modes of thought. Consequently, a need arose for an alternative 
theory that could avoid the traditional problems whilst offering a possible contemporary 
solution. This is precisely what will be examined within this paper. Today, there are a few 
contemporary theories available, the most prominent of these are Panpsychism, 
Panprotopsychism and Cosmopsychism. We will be exploring all three of these theories in 
more detail, with particular focus on the latest of these being Cosmopsychism. The main 
objective of this paper is to focus on the ontological questions regarding the mental aspect of 
consciousness, specifically with regards to the nature of consciousness and how it relates to 
the body and the rest of the universe. In our quest to find some answers, we will be focussing 
our attention on two adaptations of the Cosmopsychist theory in an attempt to discover which 
of the two theories provides stronger answers. The structure of this paper will appear as 
follows:   
Section 1 will introduce the traditional theories of Physicalism and Dualism, followed by 
section 1.1 which briefly examines Physicalism and two problems that it faces. This is then 
accompanied by section 1.2 which looks to Dualism and briefly examines the problems it 
faces. Section 2 introduces an alternative theory in the form of Russellian Monism, which will 
then lead us into a more detailed explanation of the theory in section 2.1. Section 2.2 explores 
how this theory is able to overcome the obstacles faced by the traditional theories examined 
within section 1. Following this will be section 3, which will introduce the various theories 
that makes use of Russellian Monism as a foundational framework, with particular emphasis 
on the theory of Panpsychism in section 3.1 and the theory of Panprotopsychism in section  
3.2. Following this is section 4, which introduces the serious problem of combination that 
appears to accompany theories of this nature. Within section 4.1, we will explore this problem 
in more detail, followed by how this specific problem impacts both theories respectively. 
Section 5 acknowledges the fact that there is a need for an alternative theory based on what 
was analysed in the previous section, which then leads us into the next section being 5.1.  
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This will provide a general outline of the theory known as Cosmopsychism, followed by the 
de-combination problem that appears to be attached to it in section 5.2. From this, we will then 
explore two adaptations of Cosmopsychism in depth, the first being an adaptation provided by 
Itay Shani in section 5.3, and the second being an adaptation provided by Philip Goff in section 
5.4. Once this has been done, we move onto section 5.5 which provides a brief overview of 
the de-combination problem, accompanied by section 5.6 that analyses how Shani might 
respond to the de-combination problem, and section 5.7 which looks at how Goff might 
respond to the same problem. Pen-ultimately we shall explore which fundamental basis Shani 
and Goff incorporate into their theories, followed by the final section which leads us to the 






















(1) PHYSICALISM V.S DUALISM 
Traditionally when looking at ontological questions regarding the mind, one would have been 
forced into one of two directions in terms of searching for a possible solution. The two potential 
directions that one could have chosen from would be Physicalism or Dualism. The first of 
these theories suggests that everything in the universe is physical or supervenes on the physical 
(Stoljar, 2019). In contrast, the second theory suggests that the universe is divided into two 
distinct elements being mental and physical (Robinson, 2019).   
In this chapter we will be briefly exploring these two theories in more detail in order to portray 
that both are faced with significant issues. While there have been many attempted responses 
to these problems (responses that we will not be considering here), the persistence of these 
problems motivates the idea that an alternative theory may be needed.  
(1.1) PHYSICALISM  
Physicalism became popular among philosophers and scientists from the 1860’s onwards, as a 
result of the scientific advances that had taken place at that time. These advances changed the 
way in which people thought about everyday things, which led to a scientific and mechanistic 
outlook of the world. As such many scholars changed their views in order to adapt to this 
mechanistic outlook, which led them to believe that the nature of the world could be explained 
in purely physical terms (Stoljar, 2010).  
According to the above theory, the nature of the universe, including everything within it, can 
be attributed to something physical, or that it supervenes on the physical. What this means is 
that one set of facts can completely determine another set of facts (Chalmers, 1996). For 
example, the physical truths about the world are able to determine biological truths, due to the 
fact that once all the physical truths are secured, the biological truths cannot alter (Chalmers, 
1996). In layman’s terms what this means, is that the universe and everything in it comprises 
of something that is physical in nature, or that by the very least it is a consequent of something 
physical (Stoljar, 2019). Another way to understand this, is to say that the nature of the universe 
and everything within it is grounded within the physical. The term grounded can be understood 
as a non-causal explanatory relation which holds between facts (Goff, Forthcoming). A simple 
manner in which to understand this relation is to look at an example: a rose is red in virtue of 
the fact that the rose is scarlet. The former attribute can be fully explained in terms of the latter 
attribute (Goff, Forthcoming). The terms supervenience and grounded can both be used to 
reductively explain certain concepts such as conscious experience, however for the purposes 
of this paper the term grounded will be the preferred term. 1  When physicalism is applied to 
the mind and its various mental states like consciousness for example, it is believed that these 
states are nothing more than consequents of the brain and its various functions.  
A simpler way to understand this, is to think that everything that exists must have a cause. 
Daniel Stoljar calls this argument “The Argument from Causal Closure”. Within this 
argument, it is stated that for every possible event there must be a sufficient cause, and that 
such causes need be physical in nature. When applied to matters of the mind, we assume that 
                                            
1 For more explanations on either term, see Chalmers (1996); Goff (2017).  
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mental events cause physical ones. The reason for this is that when one has a mental urge or 
desire it appears as though that desire causes a physical action. An example of this is when one 
has a mental event such as wanting to reach for a drink on the table, this appears to cause a 
physical event whereby one actually moves one’s arm to reach for the drink on the table 
(Stoljar, 2019). This argument is the presiding theory in support of physicalism, and is the only 
argument that this paper will be reviewing. For more arguments on physicalism refer to 
(Stoljar, 2019, Chalmers, 1996). I now turn to briefly two specific objections to physicalism: 
the Knowledge argument and the Conceivability argument.   
The most straightforward version of the knowledge argument was put forth by Frank Jackson 
in 1986, in the form of a thought experiment about an individual he calls Mary. The thought 
experiment goes as follows: Imagine a renowned neuroscientist called Mary who has been 
restricted to a black and white room for her entire life. Mary learns all there is to know about 
the world through black and white television, computers and books. Regardless of her 
restrictions, Mary has been able to learn everything there is to know about physical theory, and 
thus knows all there is to know about the physical.  According to the theory of physicalism, 
Mary knows everything there is to know about the world. However, there appears to be 
something that Mary doesn’t know. When Mary is finally allowed to leave her black and white 
room, and comes across a red rose, she learns something new. Mary learns what it is like to 
see a red rose, she learns about the qualia (quality/property) of certain experiences such as that 
of seeing colour. This suggests that there are some facts about the world (i.e., facts about 
conscious experience) that are over and above the physical facts.  
The conceivability argument begins with the idea that if something is conceivable then it is 
possible. This can then be understood as the claim if something can be coherently conceived, 
then it exists in some possible world. ‘Possible’ here is meant to be understood as 
metaphysically possible (i.e., possibility in the broadest sense). The argument then goes that it 
is conceivable that there is a world very much like our own world in all physical respects, 
where human beings exist yet lack conscious experience. If such a thought is conceivable, then 
it is possible that such a world exists. The argument concludes that as it is possible for humans 
and consciousness to come apart in this way, there is more to conscious experience than given 
by the physical. To illustrate this point more clearly, one can consider the following possibility 
of ‘zombies’.  
The concept of zombies was introduced into this argument in 1974 by Robert Kirk, but was 
later developed by David Chalmers and as such is more commonly known as the zombie 
argument. The term zombie is to be understood in philosophical terms as an exact replica of a 
human being in terms of physical and behavioural aspects, the only difference however is that 
these zombies lack consciousness. In other words, there is nothing it is like to be a 
philosophical zombie (Chalmers, 1996). The above thought experiment can be seen as follows: 
Philosophical zombies are conceivable. If these zombies are conceivable then they are 
possible. If these zombies are possible, then that suggests physicalism is false. These zombies 
are possible, which results in physicalism being false. This presents with a serious problem for 
physicalists, as they are now unable to provide an explanation for the existence of 
consciousness, as it is viewed as a nonphysical fact about our world (Chalmers, 1996). It seems 
then that there are certain facts about our world that cannot be explained in physical terms, and 
that consciousness is not grounded in the physical.  
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As a result of these two problems for physicalism, some have been tempted to go in the 
opposite direction in search of a theory about our world that adds certain non-physical facts to 
our current theories. This direction would lead one onto the path of Dualism.  
  
(1.2) DUALISM  
If the knowledge argument and the conceivability argument hold true, this suggests that there 
is something extra which is non-physical in nature that needs to be accounted for. Due to the 
physicalist’s inability to account for non-physical entities, another theory needs to be examined 
that is able to surpass this problem. Such a theory comes in the form of dualism. In simple 
terms, dualism states that there are two fundamentally distinct kinds of properties that exist 
within the universe, and it takes the position that at least certain aspects of the mind and those 
of the body are in some unequivocal sense fundamentally distinct from one another, in that 
some mental phenomena are non-physical in nature (Robinson, 2019). There are however a 
variety of theories under the term dualism, and the reason for this variation depends on one’s 
choice regarding what to be dualistic about. Two of the most prominent elements that one 
could choose from are substance and property which in turn gives rise to what is known as 
substance dualism and property dualism (Robinson, 2019).  
Property dualism suggests that fundamentally, there is only one type of substance that exists 
in the world which is physical, but that the physical has two distinct kinds of properties – 
mental properties and physical properties. Substance dualism on the other hand, states that 
there are two fundamentally distinct kinds of substances that exist within the universe – mental 
substances and physical substances – and that they each have their own unique properties. 
What follows is however neutral between these two versions of dualism.  
To see how the theory of dualism works, one can refer to the knowledge argument or 
conceivability argument which are often seen as arguments for dualism as both seem to point 
to the requirement for further non-physical facts to account for conscious experience. In the 
knowledge argument, Mary learns something new when she leaves her black and white room, 
she learns what it is like to see colour, which suggests that there are non-physical facts about 
the world that need to be accounted for. In the conceivability argument, it is possible to have 
a world identical to ours but that lacks conscious people, which suggests consciousness is non-
physical in nature and fundamentally distinct from the physical.   
There are a number of issues that specifically plague the theory of dualism, however this paper 
will only be focussing on two of the most prominent of these, being the problem of interaction, 
and the exclusion problem. The core aspect of the dualist theory states that the mental and 
physical are fundamentally distinct yet have the ability to causally interact. This has been the 
selling point for this theory as it allows one to avoid the physicalist’s problems. However, as 
convenient as this aspect is, it also appears to be disadvantageous towards the theory, as it 
presents with a problem. The first problem for dualists focuses on the problem of trying to 
account for the causal interaction between the mental and the physical if these are 
fundamentally distinct (Heil, 2004). If these are fundamentally distinct kinds, how can we 
explain the causal interaction between them – we can’t do so in purely physical terms, nor can 
we do so in purely mental terms.   
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A dualist may try to counteract this problem by suggesting that the causal interaction between 
mental and physical is “sui generis”. However this only exacerbates the problem, as this 
unique type of interaction goes against our natural laws, and thus comes at what seems to many 
to be a considerable cost (Heil, 2004).   
The second problem for dualists deals with the exclusion problem, and is generally considered 
to be the biggest problem for dualists. The problem it raises for the dualist is for them to show 
how mental states avoid being merely overdetermined causes (i.e., causes of an effect that 
already has a distinct sufficient cause). The question raised is given that we have reason to 
believe that the physical is causally complete (i.e., that every physical effect has a sufficient 
physical cause), how can mental states do anything but overdetermine effects? (Bennett, 2007). 
One could think of the problem by considering the following analogy. Suppose that there are 
two obstacles that a student faces when searching for employment, the first requires that the 
student possess the specific skills necessary for the job, and the second requires that there be 
employment opportunities available in the desired field. It is one thing to be suitable for the 
job, and it is an entirely different matter that there be such a job available. The exclusion 
problem can be viewed as analogous to the second obstacle (Bennett, 2007). If every physical 
effect has a sufficient physical cause, then what is there left for the mental causes to do? At 
best, there could be an overdetermination of causes. And such overdetermination would have 
to be systematic, in that every physical event that is claimed to have a mental cause would 
already have (given the causal completeness of the physical) a fundamentally distinct sufficient 
physical cause. As we have good reason to believe in the completeness of the physical based 
on the explanatory success of the physical sciences, and given that such systematic 
overdetermination seems to many to be implausible, if we want to accept that the mental can 
do causal work, it seems that the mental can’t be fundamentally distinct from the physical, and 
so dualism is false. This argument’s objective is to put the spotlight on the dualist’s inability 
to show that mental states are not overdetermined causes, and that as a result this inability 
functions as the biggest argument against dualism. 2    
  
(2) AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY  
Upon reviewing the above theories, it seems that the traditional routes on offer do not provide 
sufficient solutions to the problems they face. The theory of physicalism although attractive 
seems unable to account for consciousness, and dualism although capable of accounting for 
consciousness, suffers from its own explanatory gap in that it is unable to explain how mental 
and physical entities are capable of interacting, and how mental states are not overdetermined 
causes. This suggests that these traditional theories are ineffective in providing sufficient 
solutions to the ontological questions regarding the mind-body problem, and that one needs to 
search for an alternative theory that not only encompasses the best of both abovementioned 
theories, but one that avoids the problems that they both face. In this section, such an 
alternative theory will be examined in the form of Russellian Monism.   
                                            
2 For more information regarding the various options of denying each premise, see Bennett (2007), and more 




(2.1) RUSSELLIAN MONISM  
Russellian monism seems to encompass the best of physicalism and dualism but avoids the 
problems that they both possess. This theory is based on the ideology that “a single set of 
properties underlies both consciousness” as well as the most fundamental entities of the 
universe. (Alter and Pereboom, 2019). It was developed in light of philosopher Bertrand 
Russell’s views regarding the ontology of consciousness, and was as a result partly based on a 
“structuralist interpretation of theoretical physics” (Alter and Pereboom, 2019). This 
interpretation explains how the world works in terms of structure and dynamics within time 
and space and the various changes that take place, but neglects to explain what the basis of 
such changes are. In simpler terms what is known about the world is how it functions, however 
what remains unknown is what exactly the basis of such functions might be. Here is where the 
theory of Russellian Monism comes into play, as it attempts to provide an answer to the 
question of what underlies the structure and dynamics of the universe. According to this theory, 
the things that underlie the structure and dynamics of the universe are granted with properties 
that may in some way ground consciousness (Alter and Pereboom, 2019).  
Russellian Monism is comprised of an amalgamation of three central theses, the first of these 
is structuralism about physics, which suggests that physics categorizes the world according to 
its spatiotemporal structure and dynamics. The second theses is realism about quiddities, 
which suggests that what underlies these structures and dynamics just mentioned, are 
quiddities or properties. The third theses is quidditism about consciousness, which suggests 
that these quiddities or properties are pertinent to consciousness (Alter and Pereboom, 2019). 
In order to comprehend this theory, each component will be examined in further detail.  
The first component of Russellian Monism is termed structuralism about physics, which looks 
at our scientific understanding of the world’s basic structures according to time and space and 
the various movements and changes that take place. The basic structures of the world are 
understood in terms of their various relations to other things, such as a causal relation for 
example (Alter and Pereboom, 2019). Due to scientific explanation, the world’s basic 
structures are viewed as being in a constant state of causal flow. In simpler terms, what this 
means is that one’s understanding of the world comes down to the causal connection between 
entities (Chalmers, 1996). For further understanding, one could look at the distinction between 
extrinsic and intrinsic properties, or more specifically the differentiation between relatively 
and absolutely intrinsic properties (Pereboom, 2011).   
Intrinsic properties are the properties that make something what it is, whereas extrinsic 
properties are how things are around other properties, or how things are in relation to other 
things. Take for example a tennis ball, an intrinsic property of the tennis ball is that it is 
spherical in nature, whereas the extrinsic property of the ball would be that it has the ability to 
bounce when dropped. One could go further by distinguishing from “relatively intrinsic 
properties which are properties that are nothing over and above extrinsic properties and 
absolute intrinsic properties, which are properties that are not relatively intrinsic”, however 
this remains an inquiry for another day (Alter and Pereboom, 2019).   
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To make the distinction between these two properties clearer, one can view them as follows 
according to (Pereboom, 2016):  
P is a relatively intrinsic property of X just in case P is an intrinsic property of X and 
P is grounded in extrinsic properties of either X or parts of X.    
P is an absolute intrinsic property of X just in case P is an intrinsic property of X and 
P is not grounded in extrinsic properties of either X or parts of X. 3   
If structuralism about physics is understood in such a way that structural properties are 
explained as extrinsic properties or relatively intrinsic properties, then this shows us that 
physics only provides a partial explanation of the basic entities which exist within the world 
(Alter and Pereboom, 2019).   
The second component of this theses is termed realism about quiddities, which suggests that 
there are properties of a certain kind that exist that physics has yet to examine, and which 
underlies the spatiotemporal structural properties of the world. According to Alter and 
Pereboom (2019), these kinds of properties ground the fundamental physical tendencies 
described to us by physics. These fundamental properties have been given the term quiddities. 
To make sense of this one could refer back to the tennis ball, whereby the tennis ball’s round 
shape grounds its tendency to be able to bounce (Lewis, 2009; Chalmers, 2012). What this 
component suggests is that the explanation that physics provides about the world is merely a 
partial explanation, as it focuses only on relatively intrinsic properties or extrinsic properties, 
and ignores the existence of more basic properties. Realism about quiddities suggests that there 
is something more that needs to be examined and explained, in the sense that fundamentally 
there are properties that underlie and ground these extrinsic and relatively intrinsic properties 
(Alter and Pereboom, 2019).   
The third component of this theses is termed quidditism about consciousness, which states that 
quiddities play a significant role in understanding and explaining consciousness. To 
understand this, one could reflect upon the feeling one usually experiences when seeing a 
bright colour such as yellow, or the feeling of pain one experiences when one stubs one’s toe. 
There is generally something it is like to have phenomenal conscious experiences such as these 
(Alter and Pereboom, 2019).   
Despite the disagreements about how exactly quiddities play an important role in conscious 
experiences, Russellian monists are in agreement that phenomenal properties are constructed 
by quiddities, or that they consist of various structural properties in addition to quiddities (Alter 
and Pereboom, 2019). Russellian monism could be classified as the combination of the above 
three theses, where each is explained in a variety of ways which would result in an array of 
interpretations. For the purposes of this paper the above will be sufficient. 4  Now that we’ve 
examined the theory of Russellian monism in more detail, we can move onto why it is 
considered to be a superior alternative in terms of providing answers to the mind-body 
problem.    
                                            
3 For more on these distinctions see Pereboom (2016); Kant (1781).  




(2.2) RUSSELLIAN MONISM TO THE RESCUE  
What makes Russellian monism more attractive in terms of possible options, is the fact that it 
embodies the best of what physicalism and dualism have to offer, while avoiding the specific 
problems associated with these theories (Chalmers, 2013). To see how this is possible, each 
theory’s setbacks will be examined in turn.  
Recall that physicalism states that the nature of the universe and everything in it is physical or 
that it is grounded in the physical, and that when it comes to the mind-body problem, mental 
states are merely consequences of physical functions. As noted previously, this physical 
outlook of the world presents with a serious problem as consciousness is not accounted for, 
which was made evident by the knowledge argument and the conceivability argument. This is 
where the theory of Russellian monism comes in handy, as it is able to preserve this scientific 
outlook of the world. According to Russellian monism the properties that construct 
consciousness such as quiddities play a vital role when it comes to the physical. As a result, 
consciousness and/or its components are therefore integrated into the physical which 
eliminates the problem of having to account for them (Alter and Pereboom, 2019). To see how 
this is possible, let us look at the following.  
If one reflects back to the knowledge argument, one will remember that neuroscientist Mary 
spent her entire life confined to a black and white room, and that she learnt all there is to know 
about the physical world through her black and white resources. When she finally leaves her 
room for the first time and comes across a red rose, she learns something new. She learns what 
it is like to see the colour red. As previously mentioned, this suggested that the theory of 
physicalism was false, as it could not account for this fact about the world, which was Mary’s 
colour experience. But, according to Russellian monism, Mary’s various resources on the 
physical world leave out information regarding quiddities, and as such only provide her with 
half of the physical truths about the world. These truths would have been nonstructural 
quiddistic truths, but nevertheless physical truths (Alter and Pereboom, 2019).   
The conceivability argument looks at the conceivability of a zombie world, which appears to 
be identical to our world, except for the fact that it lacks consciousness. The Russellian monist 
would respond to this argument by stating that a zombie world is not ideally conceivable, and 
that advocates of this argument are confusing a zombie world with a structural zombie world. 
Conceiving of a structural zombie world is conceiving of a world that lacks consciousness, but 
only replicates all the structural properties of our world to a minimum extent, ignoring the 
quiddities. But for the zombie argument to have any force, what is required is not that a 
structural zombie world is conceivable, but that a zombie world is conceivable, a world that is 
the same as our world in terms of the structure and quiddities, yet lack consciousness. But we 
lack sufficient reason to believe that such a world is conceivable, and thereby to believe that a 
zombie world is ideally conceivable. In simpler terms, what this means is that our perception 
of a zombie world being conceivable is mistaken. The reason being is that if a zombie world 
existed then it would only be a replica of our world in terms of the structural components. Our 
world is however constructed of both the structural components as well as the quiddistic 
components, and these quiddistic components ground consciousness.   
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What the above exhibits is that Russellian monism is capable of retaining the physical 
explanation of the world, but that this physical explanation includes not only structural truths, 
but quiddistic ones as well. This provides a nicely wrapped solution as consciousness is viewed 
as being comprised of nonstructural quiddities or parts thereof, which accommodates a 
physicalist view of the world and in addition, managing to account for consciousness while 
simultaneously taking nothing away from it (Alter and Pereboom, 2019). Now that one has 
viewed how the alternative theory has fared against the physicalist’s problems, one can move 
onto examining how Russellian monism handles the problems faced by dualists. If one thinks 
back to the theory of dualism, one would remember that this theory stated that there are two 
distinct properties that exist within the universe, the one being physical and the other mental. 
In terms of the mind-body problem, dualists argued that the mind and body were fundamentally 
distinct yet managed to causally interact. This appeared to be a perfectly adequate theory until 
one was faced with the specific problems associated with this view.   
Dualists seemed unable to explain how two entities that are fundamentally distinct could 
possibly interact, and even if they could, how the mental could avoid being an overdetermined 
cause. Once again, the theory of Russellian monism is able to offer assistance in solving these 
problems. Due to this alternative theory’s retention of the physicalist’s best aspects, along with 
its ability to solve its problems, it automatically retained the best part of the dualist theory in 
that it accounts for non-physical entities, while taking nothing away from consciousness. All 
that’s left to do now, is to show how Russellian monism avoids the problems that dualists face.   
Recall the first component of Russellian monism termed structuralism about physics, which 
looks at the scientific understanding of the world’s most basic structures. According to physics, 
the most basic structures of the universe are understood in terms of their causal relations, and 
that these structures are constantly in a causal flow (Chalmers, 1996).   
This component immediately solves the first problem faced by dualists, as it eliminates the 
mystery behind causal interaction. To see how, one need only look at the second component 
of the theory, which states that there are properties of a certain kind (quiddities) which underlie 
the spatiotemporal structural properties of the universe. These quiddities ground the 
fundamental physical tendencies explained to us by physics (Alter and Pereboom, 2019). 
Additionally, when one factors in the third component of the theory, one will remember that 
quiddities play a crucial role in understanding and explaining consciousness, and that 
phenomenal properties are either fully or partially grounded in quiddities or the combination 
of quiddities along with other structural properties (Alter and Pereboom, 2019). As a result of 
this, mental properties are seen as part of the basic structures of the universe and are understood 
in terms of their causal relations, which means that mental properties’ causal interaction is 
already determined by the causal relation that is already taking place within the universe. The 
above explanation also eliminates the second problem, as it erases the worry of 
overdetermination. Due to the mental being a part of the basic structures of the universe, which 
forms part of the grounding relation that takes place within the physical, the mental can now 
avoid the serious problem of being viewed as an overdetermined cause.  
The reason is that the mental is constituted in the physical, which means that it is viewed as a 
specific property within the physical. Therefore when an event is caused, there is no 
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overdetermination of causes because the mental is merely a physical property which allows it 
the freedom to cause certain events.    
From all the information provided above, it appears clear that the theory of Russellian monism 
as an alternative theory is appropriately equipped to solve the problems faced by both 
physicalists and dualists alike, in addition to retaining the best aspects of each traditional 
theory. As a result, Russellian monism seems to be the best possible option when attempting 
to engage with the various problems associated with the mind-body problem. It is from this 
point that one must examine the various options within the framework of Russellian monism, 
in order to establish which theory is better suited to take on the task of solving the mysteries 
surrounding the mental phenomena of consciousness.  
  
(3) VERSIONS OF RUSSELLIAN MONISM  
Russellian monism is an amalgamation of three central theses, being structuralism about 
physics, realism about quiddities and quiddities about consciousness as mentioned previously. 
Depending on what a philosopher’s intentions are, each thesis could be developed in its own 
manner resulting in a range of adaptations of the theory. Across the board Russellian monists 
are in agreement that quiddities play a significant role when it comes to understanding 
consciousness, where they differ is in their interpretations of what quiddities actually are (Alter 
and Pereboom, 2019). Those who understand quiddities as phenomenal properties are 
considered to be Russellian Panpsychists, whereas those who understand quiddities as 
protophenomenal properties are viewed as Panprotopsychists (Chalmers, 2013). Then there 
are another class of Russellian monists who interpret quiddities as being cosmophenomenal 
properties, which would result in them being classed as Cosmopsychists (Goff, 2017). In what 
follows we will explore the abovementioned adaptations in more detail in an attempt to 
discover which theory offers the better solution for the ontological questions surrounding 
consciousness. 5  
 
(3.1) PANPSYCHISM  
The first adaptation of the above theory is termed Russellian Panpsychism, or more simply 
Panpsychism. This version of the theory states that phenomenality is universal as it appears 
everywhere in the same manner that fundamental physical properties do (Alter and Pereboom, 
2019). Specifically with regards to Russellian Panpsychism, phenomenal quiddities are viewed 
as being either partially or completely responsible for the fundamental physical properties that 
construct our world (Chalmers, 2013). These fundamental properties of the world are thought 
to only exist at a microlevel, and panpsychists argue that some types of micro-level entities 
possess mental properties and that these types of entities are found all throughout the physical 
universe (Goff, Seager and Allen-Hermanson, 2017). In simpler terms, what this means is that 
Russellian panpsychists view quiddities as microphenomenal properties.   
                                            
5 For more adaptations of Russellian Monism see Alter and Pereboom (2019); Chalmers (2013); Goff (2017); 
Goff, Seager and Allen -Hermanson (2017); Wishon (2017).  
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To understand this more clearly, it is worth briefly examining the distinction between 
microphenomenal properties and macrophenomenal properties. Microphenomenal properties 
are the sorts of properties found within microexperiences that portray what it is like to be a 
microphysical entity. These entities are the fundamental physical entities of the universe. 
Macrophenomenal properties on the other hand are the sorts of properties found within 
macroexperiences, which portray what it is like to be a macrophysical entity. Such 
macrophysical entities could be human beings or animals or any other type of entity that is not 
regarded as a fundamental physical entity of the universe (Chalmers, 2013). As such, 
Panpsychism is the view that microphenomenal properties constitute quiddities, as they 
perform the roles generally associated with microphysical properties and additionally function 
as the grounds for macrophenomenal properties (Chalmers, 2013). To see how such a view 
could be supported, one could refer to the argument against mysterious natures put forward 
by Galen Strawson in 2016.   
 
This argument states that our evidence for the existence of entities completely lacking 
consciousness, is more uncertain than the evidence we have for microconsciousness (Strawson, 
2016). The reason being is that the only aspect of reality that we have considerable knowledge 
of, with regards to what it is like “from the inside” comprises of our own conscious mental 
lives. What this suggests according to Donovan Wishon is that the theory of Panpsychism is 
fairer compared to other theories, “as it takes reality to be of a kind with the only part of reality 
whose underlying nature we grasp” (Wishon, 2017:p58). 6 As we move forward with the 
exploration of the following Russellian monist theories, one will notice that they each possess 
elements of Panpsychism. Both Panprotopsychism and Cosmopsychism have made use of this 
theory in order to generate their own adaptations regarding the ontology of consciousness, and 
it is to these adaptations that we shall now turn our attention to.  
  
(3.2) PANPROTOPSYCHISM  
The theory of Panprotopsychism is relatively similar to that of panpsychism, except for the 
fact that it argues that proto-consciousness is fundamental and universal. The properties that 
generally define conscious experience are termed “phenomenal properties” therefore the 
properties associated with proto-consciousness be termed “protophenomenal properties” 
(Goff, Seager and Allen-Hermanson, 2017). To make more sense of this, one could think of 
protophenomenal properties as unique properties that are not in themselves phenomenal, but 
that have the ability to conjointly comprise phenomenal properties when organized in the right 
structural manner. In effect what this suggests, is that Panprotopsychism is the notion that some 
fundamental physical entities have protophenomenal properties (Chalmers, 2013).   
These unique properties are thought to have a particularly inseparable link to phenomenal 
properties. To better understand this, one could explore the attraction to this uniqueness within 
the definition, which requires that:  
                                            
6  See Chalmers (2013) (2016); Goff, Seager and Allen - Hermanson (2017); Shani (2015); Nagasawa and 
Wager (2015); Wishon (2017) for more information regarding the theory of Panpsychism and its variations.   
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(i) Protophenomenal properties are different from structural properties and;   
(ii) that there be an a priori entailment from truths about protophenomenal 
properties to truths about the phenomenal properties that they form (Chalmers, 2013: 
p15).   
A possible objection is that Panprotopsychism seems to suffer from the same sorts of issues 
associated with the theory of Physicalism. This objection states that the epistemic arguments 
against Physicalism all point to the fact that there is a fundamental epistemic gap between the 
phenomenal and the nonphenomenal and that there is no a priori entailment from the 
nonphenomenal to the phenomenal (Chalmers, 2013). According to David Chalmers, this 
objection is incorrect as this gap in the objection to Physicalism relies on the gap between the 
physical and the phenomenal, which stems from a gap between the structural and the 
phenomenal. Chalmers argues that we have sufficient reasons to think that phenomenal truths 
cannot be completely grounded in structural truths, however we do not have the same sufficient 
reasons to think that phenomenal truths cannot be completely grounded in nonphenomenal 
truths as suggested by panprotopsychists. Although we do not have a clear idea of what 
protophenomenal properties are like, except for the fact that they are classified with regards to 
their relation to phenomenal properties, this limited knowledge is not enough to serve as an 
objection to the truth of Panprotopsychism (Chalmers, 2013).   
 
There are a variety of Panprotopsychist theories, such as constitutive panprotopsychism and 
non-constitutive panprotopsychism, there is also Russellian and non-Russellian 
panprotopsychism, similar to what one would encounter with Panpsychist theories. With 
regards to constitutive panprotopsychism, the idea is that “macroexperience is grounded within 
the protophenomenal properties of microphysical entities, which implies that phenomenal 
truths are grounded within the protophenomenal truths of said entities” (Chalmers, 2013:p16). 
When it comes to Russellian panprotopsychism, the idea is that there are some quiddities that 
are considered to be protophenomenal properties, which suggests that these properties could 
potentially play a specific role in grounding the structural properties such as mass or charge. 
In terms of Nonconstitutive panprotopsychism and nonRussellian panprotopsychism, the idea 
is that protophenomenal properties merely account for some macroexperiences and that there 
is the possibility that these properties might not act as quiddities. 7  In terms of all the variations 
just mentioned, the form of panprotopsychism most suitable to our needs is the one advocated 
by David Chalmers, which is termed Constitutive Russellian Panprotopsychism. It is this 
variation that shall be the focus in what follows.    
Constitutive Russellian Panprotopsychism can be viewed as the notion that macroexperience 
is grounded in the protophenomenal properties of microphysical entities and that all 
phenomenal truths are grounded in protophenomenal truths concerning these entities 
(Chalmers, 2013). This type of Panprotopsychism avoids the issues faced by physicalists and 
dualists alike, as it is able to respond to the arguments posed against both theories. For 
example, the response to the zombie argument against physicalists would state that zombies 
                                            
7   For more information regarding the various forms of Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism see Chalmers 
(2013; 2016); Goff, Seager and Allen-Hermanson (2017).   
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are prima facie conceivable but that they are not ideally conceivable. At first glance, the former 
would be conceivable as it seems possible (with regards to the information presented at the 
time) for one to imagine a human duplicate without conscious experience. However on the 
latter, such zombies would not be ideally conceivable, as given all the facts about the structure 
of our world and what grounds this structure it is impossible. In simpler terms, what this means 
is that zombies merely seem conceivable when all we focus on is the structural properties, but 
that a world identical to ours could not have such zombies that lack consciousness because the 
fundamental building blocks of our world contain protoconsciousness. With regards to the 
arguments posed against dualists, the constitutive Russellian panprotopsychist would respond 
by saying that fundamental protophenomenal properties are causally significant in light of the 
fact that they realize microphysical roles, and that macrophenomenal properties are granted 
with causal significance from protophenomenal properties in light of the fact that they are 
grounded in them (Chalmers, 2013). As such, these protophenomenal properties avoid the 
problem of being overdetermined causes because they form part of the causal interactions that 
take place within our physical world. 8  
Upon reflection both Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism function under the subtle 
assumption of what Gregory Miller argues is “priority pluralism”, which states that the 
fundamental fabric of reality exists at the micro-level (Miller, 2017:p1). Coleman (2006) refers 
to this view as “smallism”, which states that  “facts about big things are grounded in facts 
about little things” (Goff, Seager, Allen-Hermanson, 2017:p11). What is implied here, is that 
these theories are built upon the presupposition of what is more commonly known as 
Micropsychism. The definition of micropsychism as provided by Goff (forthcoming) states 
that “all facts, including facts about organic consciousness are grounded in consciousness-
involving facts at the microlevel.” One need only to refer back to the descriptions of the 
abovementioned theories to see how this has been incorporated. According to Panpsychism, 
macroexperience is grounded in microexperience, which suggests that macroexperience is 
either completely or partially comprised of microexperience. Additionally this means that 
macrophenomenal truths exist on account of microphenomenal truths (Chalmers, 2013). In 
essence what this all amounts to is that the accumulation of microexperiences at the 
fundamental level generate macroexperience.  
 
When one looks at Panprotopsychism, one finds something similar. In alignment with the 
version of panprotopsychism advocated by David Chalmers, it is stated that macroexperience 
is grounded in the protophenomenal properties of microphenomenal entities, and that all 
phenomenal truths are grounded in the protophenomenal truths of said entities (Chalmers, 
2013:p16). As a result of this underlying assumption, both theories are classed as bottom-up 
views. The reason for this classification is due to the fact that they are based on the notion that 
the combination of micro-level entities at the fundamental level of reality will give rise to 
macro-level entities. It is this very notion that, as we will see, then leads these theories into a 
multitude of problems concerning combination. In what follows we will analyse the various 
types of combination problems that arise, while paying particular attention to the arguments 
                                            
8 For more information regarding Panprotopsychism see Chalmers (2013); Goff, Seager and Allen- Hermanson 
(2017); Wishon (2017).  
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put forth by Coleman in his ‘subject combination problem’, which has been deemed the hardest 
of all the combinations. 9  
  
(4) A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE “BOTTOM-UP” THEORIES  
Given the arguments reviewed thus far, it seems apparent that Panpsychists and 
Panprotopsychists are fully capable of solving the various obstacles associated with the 
traditional mind-body theories. The fact that these alternative theories manage to come to the 
rescue, is the reason that they appear to be so attractive (Shani, 2015). However, this attraction 
could prove to be short lived when one acknowledges that these theories are not immune to 
obstacles of their own. The types of obstacles associated with the bottom-up theories could 
prove to be so detrimental, that it positions them in the very same category as that of the Dualist 
and Physicalist obstacles, rendering them near impossible to solve. As with any theory, there 
are a variety of problems associated with Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism, but for the 
purposes of this paper we will focus on the combination problems, with particular emphasis 
on the subject combination problem.   
  
(4.1) THE COMBINATION PROBLEM  
The combination problem was initially posed by William James in 1890 and was later coined 
as such by William Seager in 1995 (Chalmers, 2013). This problem poses a unique obstacle 
for both Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism as they are both viewed as Bottom-up theories. 
What this means is that they start with phenomenal or protophenmenal properties of physical 
ultimates and try to build ordinary phenomenal properties from there (Nagasawa and Wager, 
2015). In order to fully grasp why this poses such a serious problem for these theories, it is 
imperative that one begin by getting a clearer understanding of the problem itself. William 
James frames the problem as follows:  
Take a hundred [feelings], shuffle them and pack them as close together as you can 
(whatever that might mean); still each remains the same feeling it always was, shut in 
its own skin, windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There 
would be a hundred and-first feeling there, if, when a group or series of such feelings 
were set up, a consciousness belonging to the group as such should emerge. And this 
101 s t feeling would be a totally new fact; the 100 original feelings might, by a curious 
physical law, be a signal for its creation, when they came together; but they would have 
no substantial identity with it, nor it with them, and one could never deduce the one 
from the others, or (in any intelligible sense) say that they evolved it (James, 
1890/2007:160).   
According to Sam Coleman (2013), one could distinguish between two versions of the 
combination problem by identifying what James means by his use of the term “Feeling”. One 
could take the first interpretation of the term to mean something along the lines of ‘qualitative 
                                            
9 For more in depth arguments on micropsychism see Chalmers (2013; 2016); Goff (Forthcoming); Goff, 
Seager and Allen- Hermanson (2017); Kastrup (2017; 2018); Miller (2017); Nagasawa and Wager (2015).     
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element’. To understand what is meant by ‘qualitative element’, one could refer to the 
following explanation.  
Consider your current complete phenomenal experience, and notice how it comprises other 
things/experiences (like the feeling of your hands holding this article, or the feeling of seeing 
the words on the page you are currently reading) and notice how this experience is not in itself 
a component of any further experience. It is the ultimate property of yourself. If you were to 
now isolate one component of your entire experience, such as the component of seeing a white 
page with black letters spread across it, this visual experience would be regarded as a 
‘qualitative element’ of the entire qualitative phenomenal sphere that you are able to enjoy via 
the various senses and faculties you possess (Coleman, 2013). What this example is meant to 
show is that the chosen qualitative element (or any other that could be chosen) could be isolated 
and described in its entirety, without having to mention the subject that is you. There seems to 
be no need, as you are the only one enjoying this particular experience, and we are able to 
identify the isolated component of your entire experience in purely qualitative terms. In 
simpler terms, what this means is that we are able to pick out a certain experience (like the 
experience of seeing a black and white page) without having to mention the “who” that is 
having the experience, which means that the visual experience is nothing more than a 
qualitative element of your overall experience (Coleman, 2013).  
The second interpretation of the term ‘feeling’ appears when James mentions the assembly of 
feelings producing ‘a consciousness belonging to the group as such…a 101 s t feeling’. What 
this suggests is that the 101 s t feeling is a separate, unique entity, that is created by the original 
100 entities, and that this appears to be in alignment with panpsychist theories (Coleman, 
2013). The meaning here is supposedly thought to be similar to that of ‘subject’ according to 
James, as he utilizes the terms ‘a consciousness’ and ‘a feeling’ interchangeably. 
Consciousness is to be understood as being what something is like for someone, and the term 
someone is to be understood as the subject. As such, when one refers back to James’ 
explanation, one is able to see that the first interpretation of the term ‘feeling’ translates to 
qualitative elements that are experienced by a subject, and the second interpretation is meant 
to refer to the experiencing subjects (Coleman, 2013).   
One’s everyday understanding of the term feeling appears to align with the first interpretation, 
as people usually think of feelings as being the sorts of things one directly experiences, and 
these experiences usually don’t require any mention of the actual person having the experience. 
One can merely identify these elements by making use of the various qualities they represent. 
This however does not imply that qualitative elements could exist apart from the subject 
experiencing them, but it does suggest that one is able to describe these elements without 
having to mention the subject within the description (Coleman, 2013). Now that we have 
examined the two possible interpretations of the term ‘feeling’ in more detail, we can see more 
clearly that the problem put forth by James can be perceived in two separate manners.   
(1) Qualitative elements/ experiences cannot be assembled so as to have a 




(2) Subjects of experience cannot be assembled so as to have a substantial identity 
with their product.  
Substantial identity in alignment with James’ explanation, is to be understood as an item that 
intelligibly evolves from its antecedents (James, 1890/2007:160). What is meant by this is that 
the qualitative elements/ subjects are distinct from their newly produced “item” and that the 
new “item” evolves from the specific arrangement of these elements/subjects. The first 
interpretation suggests that the problem lies within the notion that a complex qualitative sphere 
cannot intelligibly (non-emergently, structurally) be assembled from qualitative ingredients. 
Whereas the second interpretation suggests that the problem lies within the notion that a 
macro-subject cannot intelligibly (non-emergently, structurally) be assembled from micro-
subjects (Coleman, 2013). These are merely two interpretations of the combination problem 
as argued for by Coleman. In more recent research however, philosophers have attempted to 
narrow down the specific types of combination problems as the number of interpretations have 
led to an increased variety of problems. As a result of this, the combination problem can be 
broken down into an assortment of sub-problems. In recent work, Chalmers (2016) argues that 
the combination problem can be reduced to three main sub-categories which are:  
1) The Subject Combination Problem: How do micro-subjects combine to yield 
macro-subjects (e.g. conscious beings like ourselves)?   
2) The Quality Combination Problem: How do micro-level phenomenal 
qualities combine to yield macro-level phenomenal qualities, i.e. the sorts of qualities 
found in the experiences of human beings/animals?  
3) The Structure Combination Problem: How does micro-experiential structure 
combine to yield macro-experiential structure, i.e. the kind demonstrated by the 
complex structure of visual and auditory spheres?  
To understand these problems more clearly, one can briefly outline what each of them entails.  
The Subject combination problem according to Shani and Keppler (2017), has the burden of 
having to provide a dual explanation. The first of which is to explain why any accumulation 
of subjects (regardless of how they are arranged), should induce a greater subject. The second 
requires that the notion of ‘subjective inclusion’ in alignment with macro-level conscious 
perspectives being constituted of numerous jointly present microperspectives be coherent and 
able to avoid any logical contradictions or epistemic absurdities.   
The Quality combination problem requires that one explain how the phenomenal abundance 
of the world could be explained by something as presumed and rigid as the phenomenal 
qualities demonstrated by something such as subatomic particles. The problem appears to be 
especially severe when it comes to Russellian panpsychist theorists. As Shani and Keppler 
(2017: p395) argue, all fundamental phenomenal properties are “realizers of (functionally 
characterized) primitive physical properties.” In simpler terms what this means is that on such 
a view, a sparse palette of blurry qualities is strained with the heavy duty of producing a 
magnificent and abundant spectrum of all the possible experiences that exist via the process of 
combination. This problem has thereby also been referred to as the Palette Problem 
(Lockwood, 1993).   
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Finally, the Structure Combination problem involves the mismatch between the outline of 
everyday experience and the phenomenal structure that is expected from the combinational 
behaviour of microscopic experiences. Shani and Keppler (2017) argue that this mismatch 
presents us with a paradox, as the structure of everyday experience appears to be “both too rich 
and too poor” when compared to the structure of its microexperiential base (Shani and Keppler, 
2017: p395). On one side of it, it appears arduous to comprehend how the primary structural 
properties of microscopic experiences could explain the substantial “spatiotemporal and 
multimodal complexity of macroscopic experience” (Shani and Keppler, 2017: p395). On the 
other side of things, macro-level phenomenology strikes one as unusually “coarse-grained” 
when compared to the presumed grainy structure of assemblages of microexperiences. This 
problem is thereby also known as the grain problem (Lockwood, 1993; Sellars, 1965).     
The above list does not cover all the existing combination problems within the literature, but 
merely highlights those that are addressed more frequently. What lingers now is the question 
of: which of these variations poses the greatest threat for our “Bottom-up” theories? According 
to Coleman (2013) there appears to be no serious combination problem when it comes to the 
accumulation of ‘qualitative instances’ into a ‘qualitative whole’, i.e. Quality combination. 
His argument is that there appears to be no dire concern with the idea that: ingredients that 
possess their own qualitative characters could be put together to form a whole. In other words, 
it appears to be perfectly comprehensible that a macroscopic whole with its own qualitative 
character could be the product of the qualities of the various components in addition to their 
arrangement. The example Coleman provides to show how this could be possible is that of a 
“painting’s composition”, whereby the blending of certain paint patches/ qualitative elements 
survive in their contribution to the whole, which would be the painting (Coleman, 2013: p29). 
Another everyday example is the blending of ingredients to make a meal, the individual 
ingredients or their qualities survive the combination process and are still present within the 
newly constructed whole. From this it appears evident that this type of combination could be 
possible, and that there seems to be no serious worry with regards to qualitative combination. 
There have been a number of debates with regards to this type of combination among others, 
however it is beyond the scope of this paper to entertain all the possibilities in turn. As such, 
we shall focus on the combination problem which most philosophers acknowledge to be one 
of the biggest and perhaps most unsolvable problems for Panpsychists and Panprotopsychists, 
namely the subject combination problem. 10   
  
(4.2) THE SUBJECT COMBINATION PROBLEM FOR PANPSYCHISTS  
There are a vast amount of arguments available concerning which combination problem poses 
the greatest threat in general and to specific theories. The general consensus is that the subject 
combination problem poses the gravest of threats to “bottom-up” theories and it is this very 
point that has been best portrayed by the arguments presented by Sam Coleman (2013).  
                                            
10 For more arguments on the various interpretations of the combination problem see  
Coleman (2013); Chalmers (2013; 2015; 2016); Dainton (2011); Goff, Seager and Allen- 
Hermanson (2019); Lockwood (1989; 1993); Maxwell (1978); Nagasawa and Wager (2015); Sellars (1965); 
Shani and Keppler (2017); Shani (2015); Smolin (2015); Wishon (2017).   
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As such, we will closely examine Coleman’s arguments in an attempt to fully comprehend the 
alleged insurmountable task that plagues panpsychist theorists.      
To make sense of this problem, one first needs to get a clearer understanding of what is meant 
by the concepts combination and subjects of experience. A subject is to be understood as 
something that has experiences, and something that is conscious of its phenomenal qualities. 
The fact that a subject has a certain phenomenological point of view could be taken to mean 
that there exists a private ‘sphere’ of conscious experiential occurrences that correlate with 
this subject. In other words, each subject has its own private range of experiences at their 
disposal. These experiences are distinct from those phenomenal qualities experienced by other 
subjects, and neither subject has direct access to the other’s qualitative sphere. This suggests 
that a subject can be thought of as a point of view that is added to a private qualitative sphere. 
This is where Coleman suggests that a thought experiment will portray the interrelation 
between a subject’s point of view and the qualities within her experiential scope. The 
experiment goes as follows:  
“Imagine a hundred qualitatively identical subjects at the ‘starting line’ of existence- 
their only difference is that they occupy distinct positions in space-time. They are about 
to set out on their lives. As time winds on, each takes a unique path through the 
environment, and is impinged upon differently. These different impingings result in 
different modifications of each sensory field. Thus each subjectival perspective has 
access to a qualitatively different array of qualia, as compared with other subjects, over 
its lifetime. It is the fact of these different points of view, these differently located 
‘lookouts’ on the world, that then grounds the character of the peculiar set of qualities 
each subject experiences at a given time.” (Coleman, 2013: p30).  
This thought experiment is intended to show how a subject’s point of view is related to the 
experiential range that the subject possesses, and why this relation plays a significant role. In 
terms of understanding what is meant by the concept of ‘combination’, one can look at 
Coleman’s example of the grouping of two hydrogen and one oxygen atom into a molecule of 
water. He suggests that there are two ways of viewing this type of combination, the first is in 
particular terms and the second is in property-terms. He argues that these two forms function 
in a similar way, as “they operate in parallel: combination of particulars occurs thanks to the 
integration of their properties, and combination of properties occurs as the bearers of the 
properties are combined.” (Coleman, 2013: p30). Simply put, these two rely on one another 
for combination to take place.  
According to Coleman, when hydrogen and oxygen atoms combine into water they bond 
covalently, sharing electrons. “The oxygen atom completes its outer shell by borrowing an 
electron from each hydrogen. Thus the three atoms are deformed, intrinsically modified, by 
participating in the combination of water. Yet, more importantly, all three atoms continue to 
exist once combination is achieved” (Coleman, 2013: p30). Regardless of the fact that all three 
atoms combine, each atom manages to survive within the whole, while making a contribution 
to its new nature. This could be seen if one tried to remove one atom from the whole, as the 
entire molecule would then be destroyed. The concept of combination could thus be seen as 
the forming of a new whole whereby the original components manage to exist within this new 
element, but are intrinsically altered by combining with one another. More basic examples of 
such combination could be seen in the combination of paint patches within a painting, or the 
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combination of various ingredients to make a meal. “The survival of the components is entailed 
by saying the product is their combination or union, as opposed to being merely their effect or 
descendant.” (Coleman, 2013: p31).   
One can now turn one’s attention to the combination of properties, whereby a combination 
possesses original systemic powers. A water molecule forms a dipole, which means that its 
charge has two elements, the negative element is attributed to the side of the oxygen atom, and 
the positive element is attributed to the hydrogen atoms. This is what gives water molecules 
the ability to bond, and gives water its boiling point. The newly produced element’s powers 
are merely a medley of the powers of its parts. The question then is, “what is the relationship 
of a unity’s new systemic power to the powers of its isolated, pre-combination parts?” 
(Coleman, 2013: p31). What makes the power of the unity so unique is that none of its parts 
possess it. However, this does not suggest that this new high-level power cannot be explained 
in terms of the powers possessed by its parts, as that would be regarded as a characteristic of 
emergents. Instead, the systemic powers of unities should be regarded as structural properties. 
The dipolar property of a water molecule can be understood as the interactive organization of 
the charges of its compositional atoms: these charges are arranged in such a way that they 
interact (electrons separate out and share) and the result of this interaction is that their charges 
combine to create the dipolarity that we see within the molecule (Coleman, 2013).   
The constitutive Panpsychist supposes subjectivity, which is to be seen as the possession of a 
point of view to which qualities are presented, and which acts as a fundamental feature of 
matter, such as that of mass and charge. Basic mass and charge are directly relevant to their 
higher-level instantiations. The instantiations of mass and charge at higher levels of being are 
both ultimately the result of mass/charge interactions at lower levels all the way down to the 
ultimates. And the reason for initially putting forward the notion of fundamental mass and 
charge, was to account for the higher-level instantiations of these properties that we seem to 
have direct access to. Likewise, when it comes to subjectivity which is viewed as a high level 
feature that is available to us, the constitutive panpsychist puts forward fundamental 
subjectivity to account for these high-level instances. In order for this to work, Coleman argues 
that “fundamental instances of subjectivity (ultimate subjects) would have to ‘add up to’ bigger 
subjects, as fundamental charges and masses produce higher-level instances of these 
properties.” (Coleman, 2013: p32). But this seems impossible as points of view cannot 
combine. It seems unclear as to how two micro-subjects could possibly combine into a higher-
level individual, as the combination we are after requires both ingredients to survive within 
the whole. Similarly with the case of the atoms surviving the process of combination, so would 
the microsubjects have to survive within the higher-level subject. As a result of this, one can 
reject the idea that after the process of combination only a single subject would exist. 
Moreover, it would not do to hold that only the original two points of view remain after 
combination as the objective was to gather the two subjects in order to constitute a unified 
higher-level subject with its own point of view, but if one is left with both original points of 
view then it seems we are no closer to achieving the combination of subjectivities into one 
subject.  
The constitutive panpsychist’s position is that the integration of two subjects must result in 
there being a third subject. Coleman entertains another possibility of how this might be 
achieved by posing a question. He asks whether this scenario might represent some sort of 
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overarching ‘Übersubject’, comprising as constituents the two antecedent points of view, 
which survive in the whole? One can imagine that the Über-subject’s experiential field could 
be the qualitative product of the experiential contents of the original’s. If for example, one 
original subject experiences a solitary phenomenal blueness, and the other experiences a 
redness, the Über-subject could experience both colours possibly as a mixture that results in 
experiencing purple. Regardless of this advancement in terms of assimilating experiential 
contents, we have yet to succeed where it matters most, which is in combining points of view. 
The example only manages to show that the contents of these original points of view could 
combine/mix, but it fails to show that the points of view themselves could combine. This 
example presents with three points of view, that of the original two subjects and that of the 
third new subject. Coleman considers the idea that perhaps one could view the original two 
points of view as being components of the third point of view, but then provides us with two 
arguments for why this would be unsuccessful, by referring to the essential discreteness of 
subjectperspectives.   
The first argument goes as follows:  
Consider the original two points of view. The first point of view is entirely infused with 
a blue colour and the second is entirely infused with a red colour and that is all they 
experience, respectively. To say these points of view were existent as components 
within the experiential perspective of the Über-subject (‘Ub’) would therefore be to 
say that Ub had experiences of each of these qualities in isolation, while managing to 
experience both colours at exactly the same time. What this is suggesting, is that 
experience excludes, as well as includes, which presents with a contradiction. But this 
does not seem to occur anywhere in Ub’s experience, as Ub only seems to experience 
a purple colour. Thus the original points of view cannot be seen as ingredients in Ub’s 
subjectivity. Only their contents – the redness and blueness – are (Coleman, 2013: 
p33).  
The second possibility asks us to “imagine Ub experiencing all and only blue, then all and only 
red, in series. But that, while it might (perhaps) count as occupying now Red’s point of view, 
now Blue’s, is not to have their two points of view synchronously compose Ub’s point of view, 
which is what combination requires.” (Coleman, 2013: p33).   
Coleman’s second argument attempts to show us that the original points of view don’t compose 
the third, and tries to show us what would happen if we subtracted one of the points of view. 
In the combination of the hydrogen and oxygen atoms, removal of one component 
compromises the whole. If one removed one of the hydrogen atoms from H 2 O, then the water 
molecule would be destroyed. In the paint example, if the red subject were to disappear it 
seems as though Ub wouldn’t be affected, as red’s Experiential content (the portion which 
provided the phenomenal redness) would still remain. What this shows is that Ub’s experience 
wouldn’t change, as it is not the actual subject red that is doing the work, but it’s content.   
Coleman considers a possible objection, that if Red disappears, then the experiential content 
would as well, which would mean that Ub would lose the redness from his experience, 
resulting in his purple experience fading to blue. However he argues that would at most only 
be able to prove that Red’s experiential content was integrated within Ub’s, but that is not 
enough to prove that Red’s own perspective was a component of Ub’s perspective.   
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One could argue that Ub’s existence depends on Red’s and Blue’s, so that if Red’s point of 
view disappears Ub dies off. But this example merely implies a sort of dependence on the 
original points of view, and dependence is not equivalent to constitution (Coleman, 2013: p34). 
From all the possibilities we’ve examined thus far regarding the relationship between Ub’s 
experience and those of the original two points of view’s contents, it appears as though Ub’s 
own experience can never be that of the combination of the two microsubjects, regardless of 
the fact that it might in some manner be their product.  
All of the above information points to the fact that the qualitative contents of consciousness 
could perhaps be combined, but that consciousness itself or subjects of consciousness are not 
able to because points of view are exclusive by nature, which automatically inhibits 
combination from taking place. From this, we can see that Coleman’s arguments have provided 
us with a clear picture of how the combination problem poses a serious threat to Panpsychists, 
but what of Panprotopsychists? In what follows, we will examine how Panprotopsychists fair 
in terms of the combination problem, by referring to the arguments put forth by David 
Chalmers.  
  
(4.3) THE COMBINATION PROBLEM FOR PANPROTOPSYCHISM  
In order to see how Chalmers (2013) presents this problem specifically for the 
panprotopsychists, it is worth reviewing how he presents the argument against panpsychists, 
as it is from this point that his arguments for the latter follow. The structure of the following 
arguments take the form of the conceivability argument as put forward by Goff (2009).  
Below, PP is to be taken as the combination of all microphysical and microphenomenal truths 
about the world, and Q is meant to present a macrophenomenal truth, such as ‘some 
macroscopic entity is conscious’ (Chalmers, 2013: p21).   
Premise 1: PP&~Q is conceivable.  
Premise 2: If PP&~Q is conceivable, it is possible.   
Premise 3: If PP&~Q is metaphysically possible, constitutive panpsychism is false.   
Conclusion: Constitutive panpsychism is false.  
Premise 2 and 3 in this argument are analogous to premises 2 and 3 within the conceivability 
argument against Physicalism, and are thus supported by the same reasons. According to 
Chalmers, the crux of the argument is premise 1, as it affirms the conceivability of panpsychist 
zombies, which are beings that are physically and microphenomenally identical to us (which 
include entire worlds that are physically and microphenomenally identical to ours), without 
any macrophenomenal states (Chalmers, 2013: p21). A possible justification provided by 
Chalmers for why panpsychist zombies are conceivable could be seen in James’ objection to 
panpsychism in The Principles of Psychology. The principle states that “no set of conscious 
subjects necessitates the existence of a further conscious subject” (Chalmers, 2013: p22). In 
terms of conceivability: given any set of conscious subjects and any conscious subject not in 
that set, one can always conceive of all the subjects in the set without the further subject. 
Provided any combination S of positive phenomenal truths about a group of conscious subjects 
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and any positive phenomenal truth T about a conscious subject not in that group, S&~T is 
conceivable (Chalmers, 2013: p22). Put more simply, one can conceive of micro-
consciousness without macro-consciousness and vice versa, which suggests that the one does 
not entail the other. This appears to present with an epistemic gap (subject/subject gap) as there 
appears to be no explanation of how existing subjects could give rise to the existence of distinct 
subjects.   
Chalmers argues that prima facie, it seems conceivable that any group of conscious subjects 
could exist alone without any further subjects, but that if this is true then constitutive 
panpsychists have a problem. The reason for this is because all experiences are taken to be 
experienced by conscious subjects, which implies that microexperiences will be experienced 
by microsubjects, which further implies that macroexperiences will be experienced by 
macrosubjects. However, when one applies the above principle then it seems that one is able 
to conceive of microsubjects having their microexperiences without macrosubjects 
experiencing any macroexperiences. What this is meant to show, is that we can conceive of 
the idea of having a combination of all microphenomenal truths without having any 
macrophenomenal truths.   
If one was to take this result along with that of the conceivability argument’s then one would 
have to reject the version of constitutive panpsychism that states that macroexperience is 
entirely grounded in microexperience. In order to reject the other versions of this theory, which 
state that macroexperience is grounded in microexperience in addition to structure then one 
would need to adapt the principle used above. This adaptation could appear as follows: 
S&S′&~T is conceivable, where S′ characterizes the physical and structural properties of the 
members of the original group. When implementing this principle, following premise 1 from 
above, if premises 2 and 3 are granted then constitutive panpsychism can be rejected 
(Chalmers, 2013). Here is where one might think that panprotopsychists could stand a better 
chance with regards to the combination problem as compared to panpsychists, however 
Chalmers provides a similar argument to show why this is not the case. As with the previous 
theory, panprotopsychists are faced with an adapted version of the conceivability argument, 
where PPP is meant to represent the combination of all microphysical and protophenomenal 
truths (or otherwise put protophenomenal truths, as the combination problem could be used to 
question whether supposedly protophenomenal properties are undoubtedly protophenomenal), 
and Q is a macrophenomenal truth such as the previous example (Chalmers, 2013: p23).  
Premise 1: PPP&~Q is conceivable.  
Premise 2: If PPP&~Q is conceivable, it is possible.  
Premise 3: If PPP&~Q is metaphysically possible, constitutive panprotopsychism is 
false (Chalmers, 2013: p23).   
Conclusion: Constitutive panprotopsychism is false.  
Chalmers argues again here that the crux of the argument is premise 1, as it affirms the 
existence of protophenomenal zombies: which are beings that have the same supposed 
protophenomenal properties at the microphysical level, but without consciousness. The 
conceivability of protophenomenal zombies does appear to be considerably less apparent than 
that of panpsychist zombies and the reason for this is that our understanding of 
protophenomenal properties is elusive. Nevertheless, Chalmers argues that one could be 
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attracted to a general non-phenomenal/phenomenal gap, where for any non-phenomenal truths, 
one could conceive of all of those truths obtaining without any experience whatsoever. A 
possible reason for why one should accept this, could be that there is no non-subject/subject 
gap. This claim states that “no set of truths about non-subjects of consciousness can necessitate 
the existence of distinct subjects of consciousness.” (Chalmers, 2013: p23).   
In terms of the conceivability argument: “for any set of non-subjects instantiating non-
phenomenal properties and any independent subject exhibiting phenomenal properties, we can 
conceive of the former without the latter.” (Chalmers, 2013:p23). This principle automatically 
takes us to the first premise, but why should this be accepted?   
A justification for this could be that subjects are conceptually fundamental entities, and that if 
subjects are metaphysically fundamental then that implies that they are not grounded in 
something more fundamental or that they are necessitated by the existence of other entities that 
are fundamental (Chalmers, 2013: p23). Similarly, if these subjects are conceptually 
fundamental, then they are not conceptually grounded in something more fundamental, and so 
their existence is not a priori entailed by other entities (Chalmers, 2013:p23). The above 
principles don’t appear to be apparent, but there does seem to be an intuitive attraction to them.  
Another possible justification is that of a non-quality/quality gap, which is based in the idea 
that phenomenal properties are qualitative, as they possess a range of qualities such as blueness 
or greenness etc. One could argue that non-qualitative truths never necessitate qualitative 
truths, as one is able to conceive of the former obtaining without the latter. In as much as 
protophenomenal properties are non-qualitative, this principle produces a gap between these 
properties, and the phenomenal properties that justifies premise 1 in the above argument.  From 
this, we are able to see that both panpsychists and panprotopsychists suffer from the 
combination problem in their own way. For the panpsychists it is the subject/subject gap, and 
for the panprotopsyhcists it is the non-phenomenal/phenomenal gap (Chalmers, 2013: p24). 
Whether the one problem is more difficult than the other remains a debate for another day, but 
for the purposes of this paper the above is sufficient to show that neither theory escapes the 
problem of combination. 11  
  
(5) COSMOPSYCHISM: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE BOTTOM-UP THEORIES  
From the above we see that the sorts of theories that make use of micropsychism as their 
foundation run into a serious problem, which renders them theoretically unfavourable. As such, 
we have reason to search for an alternative theory with the hopes of avoiding problems such 
as the subject combination problem. One such alternative theory comes in the form of 
Cosmopsychism. This theory states that all facts, including those concerned with macro-level 
consciousness, are all grounded in facts about the consciousness of the universe, or simply 
within ‘cosmic consciousness’ (Goff, Forthcoming). As a result, Cosmopsychism is viewed as 
a ‘top-down’ version of constitutive panpsychism, placing it in the perfect position to be taken 
as a serious alternative to the “bottom-up” views presented so far.  
                                            
11 See Chalmers (2013); Coleman (2013); Nagasawa and Wager (2015); Shani (2015); Wishon (2017) for more 
arguments on the combination problem.  
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To understand how one arrives at this conclusion, the following section will examine a general 
outline of Cosmopsychism followed by two extensive adaptations of the theory as presented 
by Itay Shani and Philip Goff respectively.  
  
(5.1) A GENERAL OUTLINE OF COSMOPSYCHISM  
The theory of Cosmopsychism presents one with an exciting alternative to that of 
contemporary micropsychist views. To understand why this alternative view is theoretically 
more attractive, one need only examine the core commitments of each theory. On the face of 
it, the core commitment of micropsychist theories is that it attributes basic consciousness (or 
protoconsciousness) to micro-level entities, and considers these entities to be fundamental. In 
other words, all facts, including those concerning macrolevel consciousness, depend upon facts 
concerning consciousness existing at the micro-level.   
In terms of Cosmopsychism, its core commitment is that the cosmic entity is fundamental and 
that it instantiates fundamental consciousness. This theory attributes basic consciousness to 
the entire cosmos, as opposed to that of micropsychist theories that attribute basic 
consciousness to micro-level entities. What this suggests, is that all facts including those 
concerning macro-level consciousness, depend upon facts concerning consciousness existing 
at the cosmic level.   
Cosmopsychism then avoids the serious problems faced by “bottom-up” theorists. The reason 
for this is that the consciousness of medium-sized objects (and others) depends upon the 
fundamental consciousness of the cosmic entity, which allows this theory to prima facie avoid 
the problem of having to explain how the consciousness of medium-sized objects is built up 
from the consciousness or protoconsciousness of smaller entities from the bottom level. As a 
result, Cosmopsychism is classed as a “top-down” theory, and in this light may be viewed as 
being theoretically more advantageous than its “bottom-up” counter-parts. 12   
In terms of the two parts which constitute the core commitment of Cosmopsychism, it can be 
further divided resulting in different versions of the view. The first part of the commitment 
divides between the view that all other properties (especially properties of consciousness of 
medium-sized objects such as humans, animals etc.) are derived from this conscious entity, 
and the view that other properties (especially properties of consciousness regarding middle-
sized objects) are not derived from this conscious entity, but rather depend on it in some weaker 
sense (these would typically be classed as emergentist properties). In what follows I will 
restrict my discussion to the former versions of Cosmopsychism that hold that all else is 
derived from the conscious entity. These views collectively fall under the umbrella of what is 
known as Constitutive Cosmopsychism. The second part of the commitment divides between 
the view that the only fundamental properties of the cosmos are properties of consciousness, 
from which nonconscious properties are derived, and the view that the cosmos has both the 
                                            
12  For more information on Constitutive and Non-constitutive forms of Cosmopsychism, see Goff, Seager and 
Allen-Hermanson (2017); Goff (2017). For more information regarding the various types of Monism, see 
Schaffer (2018).   
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fundamental properties of consciousness and then some other fundamental non-conscious 
properties (i.e. structural properties).    
Kastrup (2018) argues that the latter retains an aspect of “bottom-up” Panpsychism which 
states that “a phenomenal ultimate has both phenomenal and non-phenomenal properties” 
(Kastrup, 2018: p134). As this theory posits that the cosmos as a whole is the only phenomenal 
ultimate, this suggests that the physical and structural properties of the cosmos are not in itself 
phenomenal (Kastrup, 2018: p134). What this means is that the intrinsic part of the cosmos is 
phenomenal but that its extrinsic parts that encapsulate the cosmos’s phenomenal field, which 
is the physical matter that we can scientifically observe and measure are not phenomenal. In 
contrast, on the former view the nature of the basic fundamental entity (the cosmos) is 
inherently cosmic phenomenal consciousness (cosmic consciousness for short) (Kastrup, 
2018: p135). On this view, only the cosmic consciousness fundamentally exists, there is 
nothing outside or independent of it. Put more simply, the cosmos does not contain 
phenomenality, it is completely constituted by it (Kastrup, 2018: p135). According to Kastrup 
this interpretation of Cosmopsychism aligns with the workings of Itay Shani in his 2015 paper.   
While Cosmopsychism is able to avoid the combination problem, it faces a problem of its 
own—the Problem of De-combination. In the following section, we shall examine this 
problem in more detail as laid out by Gregory Miller, followed by an interpretation of 
Cosmopsychism from Itay Shani, as well as an interpretation provided by Philip Goff. The 
aim of comparing these interpretations is to establish which of these Constitutive 
Cosmopsychist theories is better equipped to solve the problem of de-combination, as well as 
provide potential answers to the ontological questions we have regarding consciousness. 13   
  
(5.2) THE DE-COMBINATION PROBLEM  
In this section we will look closer at a specific version of the de-combination problem for 
Cosmopsychist theories put forward by Miller (2018). In section 5.5, after looking closer at 
two specific versions of cosmopsychism, we shall return to this problem with the intention of 
investigating how these two specific cosmopsychist theories might respond to this particular 
obstacle.   
The de-combination problem is regarded as the reversal or mirror image of the combination 
problem. To see how this occurs we need to briefly revisit the combination problem, but as 
laid out by Miller (2018), as this will help us to fully understand the transition from the original 
problem to that of its reversal. As mentioned previously the combination problem has been 
attributed to William James (1890) in his work titled The Principles of Psychology, yet what’s 
more interesting is the fact that the same work can be referenced as the source for the de-
combination problem as well.   
In section 4.1 we looked at the specific argument (“Take a hundred feelings…”) James 
provided which attempted to highlight the serious problem that presented itself for 
                                            
13  For more information regarding the general outline of Cosmopsychism, see Goff (2017, Forthcoming); Goff, 
Seager and Allen-Hermanson (2017); Kastrup (2018); Mathews (2011); Shani and Keppler (2017); Nagasawa 
and Wager (2015).   
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Panpsychists. Due to the constraints of this paper we shall not revisit this argument again. 
However we shall examine a further argument provided by James that Miller appeals to in 
establishing the combination problem, which he then uses to set up the de-combination 
problem. The extended argument provided by James goes as follows:  
Neither contemporaneity, nor proximity in space, nor similarity of quality and content 
are able to fuse thoughts together which are sundered by this barrier of belonging to 
different personal minds. The breaches between such thoughts are the most absolute 
breaches in nature. Everyone will recognize this to be true, so long as the existence of 
something corresponding to the term ‘personal mind’ is all that is insisted on (James, 
1890: p226).  
From this we can ascertain that one of the problems which James brings to the surface is with 
regards to the ‘absolute breaches’ that take place between subjects and the concept of ‘personal 
mind’ (Miller, 2018: p6). This obstacle, accompanied by the problem we examined in section 
4.1, which looked at the nature of the experiencing subjects in terms of it being “shut in its 
own skin, windowless”, suggests that the combination problem revolves around the “structural 
features of consciousness” (Miller, 2018: p6). As such Miller suggests that we focus on its 
structural features which are (1) unity and (2) boundedness, as they are vital components in a 
subject’s nature (Miller, 2018: p6). Miller provides the following definitions to clarify the 
certain conditions needed for unity and boundedness to occur simultaneously.   
Phenomenal Unity: a set of experiences E 1 … E n is phenomenally unified at time T 1 
iff they have a conjoint phenomenology at T 1 , i.e. there is something which it is like 
to have them ‘together’ at T 1 .   
Phenomenal Boundedness: a set of experiences E 1 … E n is phenomenally bound at 
time T 1 iff (i) they are phenomenally unified and (ii) not phenomenally unified with 
any other experience E x beyond that set at T 1  (Miller, 2018: p6).   
Miller then suggests that the two definitions combined result in what he terms the 
‘Unity/Boundedness Inconsistency Thesis’ which he defines as follows:  
Unity/Boundedness Inconsistency Thesis (UBIT): (i) phenomenal unity cannot 
extend beyond a bound phenomenal field, and (ii) phenomenal boundedness cannot 
occur within a unified phenomenal field 14 (Miller, 2018: p7).  
According to Miller, this is what James’ concern amounts to when he talks about ‘absolute 
breaches’, as such breaches arise from unity and boundedness and which create minds that are 
private or windowless (Miller, 2018: p7). Additionally, James claims that this notion must hold 
true if there is to be any meaning behind the concept of a personal mind. Simply put, Miller 
argues that phenomenal unity and boundedness are “necessary for subjecthood” (Miller, 2018: 
p7). He expresses this concept as follows:  
                                            
14 The use of the term ‘field’ is meant to be understood as a set of unified experiences.  See Miller (2018) 
footnote 17 for more clarification.   
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Subject Essence Thesis (SET): Subjects are essentially phenomenally unified and 
bound. 15  
Taking this into consideration, Miller argues that one should view the combination problem 
as: “how can a multitude of essentially bound microsubjects and their consciousness make up 
an essentially unified macrosubject and its consciousness?” (Miller, 2018: p7). Essentially 
what Miller is suggesting is that this be seen as a problem of trying to bridge the gap between 
the absolute breaches in nature, in other words between phenomenal unity and boundedness 
(Miller, 2018). With this in mind, Miller then argues that the de-combination problem should 
be viewed as the reversal of this, being: “how can a subject with an essentially bound 
consciousness come from a cosmos-subject with an essentially unified consciousness?” 
(Miller, 2018: p8). In Miller’s view this should be seen as the problem of creating conscious 
subjects with phenomenal spheres which exhibit the most ‘absolute external breaches in 
nature’ in the unified sphere of a conscious subject that has no ‘internal breaches’ (Miller, 
2018). The statement from James which Miller utilizes as a reference point for this particular 
problem can be viewed as follows:  
I can only define ‘continuous’ as that which is without breach, crack, or division. I have 
already said that the breach from one mind to another is perhaps the greatest breach in 
nature. The only breaches that can well be conceived to occur within the limits of a 
single mind would either be interruptions, time-gaps during which the consciousness 
went out altogether to come into existence again at a later moment; or they would be 
breaks in the quality, or content, of the thought, so abrupt that the segment that 
followed had no connection whatever with the one that went before (James, 1890: 
p237).  
From this it seems as though the only breaches which could take place within a subject’s 
conscious sphere according to James are: (i) temporal or (ii) qualitative. The absolute breaches 
which result from phenomenal boundedness, cannot take place in a single subject’s 
consciousness. According to (Miller, 2018: p8) what the above suggests then is that James 
supports the Phenomenal Unity/Boundedness Inconsistency Thesis (UBIT) along with the 
Subject Essence Thesis (SET). In utilizing these two theses, Miller provides us with his 
formulation of the de-combination argument against Cosmopsychism, as follows:  
1) Cosmopsychism: The cosmos is a single subject-whole and all macro-subjects are 
subject-proper parts of the single cosmos-subject.  
2) Unity/Boundedness Inconsistency Thesis (UBIT): (i) phenomenal unity cannot 
extend beyond a bound phenomenal field, and (ii) phenomenal boundedness cannot 
occur within a unified phenomenal field.   
3) Subject Essence Thesis (SET): Subjects are essentially phenomenally unified and 
bound.   
                                            
15 The term subject essence is meant to refer to a subjects experiences which are considered phenomenally 
unified and bound in the sense that if they weren’t unified and bound, then subjects as we understand them 
would not exist. See Dainton (2014) and Bayne (2010) for similar theories.   
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4) The cosmos is essentially phenomenally unified and bound, and each of its macro-
subject-proper parts is essentially unified and bound (from 1 and 3).  
5) If the cosmos has phenomenal boundaries ‘within’ its phenomenally unified field, 
then it is not a subject, and, if phenomenal unity extends beyond the boundary of 
the subject-proper parts, then they are not subjects (from 2 and 3).   
6) Hence, the cosmos is not a subject and its proper parts are not subjects (from 4 and 
5)  
7) Hence, cosmopsychism is false (from 1 and 6) (Miller, 2018: p9).  
Miller argues here that both panpsychists and cosmopsychists fall prey to the subject-subject 
proper parthood relation problem in their own way, due to the fact that both theories are 
required to account for the vital components of unity and boundedness of conscious subjects. 
What he suggests is that it is possible to make this problem more generalized, as all that one 
would have to do is change ‘cosmos-subject’ with ‘subject-whole’ and ‘macro-subject’ with 
‘subject-part’ (Miller, 2018: p9). This appears to leave the Cosmopsychists in the same 
predicament as that of the Panpsychists, as both seem to face a similar problem. 16  
  
(5.3) COSMOPSYCHISM: ITAY SHANI’S THEORETICAL PROPOSAL    
Shani begins his theoretical proposal by stating that the Cosmopsychist theory is a deviation 
from the traditional modes of thinking within the philosophy of mind and that as a result, 
interest in this area has increased. The by-product of this interest, is the creation of numerous 
interpretations of Cosmopsychism, such as those produced by Jaskolla and Buck (2012), 
Mathews (2011), Nagasawa and Wager (2015), to name a few. Within his theory, Shani aims 
to achieve the following: firstly, he wants to show that the Cosmopsychist theory is compatible 
with what he terms FPP (Foundational Panpsychism), and that as a result of this, it can bypass 
the problems of CPP (Constitutive Panpsychism) and EPP (Emergent Panpsychism). 
Foundational Panpsychism is to be understood as “the view that ontological ultimates are 
subjects of experience, and that the relation between the subjectivity of ultimates and the 
subjectivity of macro-phenomenal subjects is one of partial grounding.” (Shani, 2015: p403). 
Secondly, he wants to show how a holistic kind of FPP offers a template which explains how 
individual subjects (specifically macro-level subjects) come to exist, with specific focus on 
individual perspective. Lastly, Shani aims to show how his theory is able to adapt to certain 
foreseeable obstacles such as that of the De-combination problem (Shani, 2015: p407).  
In order to fully comprehend Shani’s theory, we must begin by addressing the several basic 
postulates that he puts forward, along with four sub-questions as they set the groundwork for 
what follows. The first postulate of the theory is that “the cosmos as a whole is the only 
ontological ultimate there is, and that it is conscious” (Shani, 2015: p408). Shani notes here 
that from this point forward, his use of the term ‘the absolute’ should be understood as the 
“cosmic conscious entity”, as he wants to clarify what he means as well as avoid the 
connotations that have historically been given to ‘the absolute’ by idealists and other types of 
                                            
16  For other versions of the de-combination problem, see Albahari (2019), Chalmers (2015), Nagasawa and 
Wager (2016).   
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thinkers. 17  Cosmopsychism gives the opposite picture to that of modern day Panpsychism as 
it views ‘the absolute’ as being ‘the single ultimate reality’. However, Shani notes that the core 
metaphysical commitment of Panpsychism (which states that ultimates are bearers of 
consciousness) remains a constant element within the Cosmopsychist theory (Shani, 2015: 
p408).  
The second postulate of this theory is to priority monism as defined by Jonathan Schaffer, 
which states that “the cosmos as a whole is prior to its parts” (Schaffer, 2010). What this means 
is that the various parts which exist within the cosmos are dependent on the whole. This theory 
acknowledges that there are parts that exist in addition to the whole, however the whole is 
ontologically prior to these parts, which implies that everything that exists is grounded within 
the cosmos. By making this move, one is compelled to change one’s outlook on what is 
considered to be a basic entity, regardless of the size of the various parts, they are neither fixed 
nor detachable from the rest of the cosmos (Shani, 2015: p408). Simply put, all parts are 
metaphysically dependent on the cosmos. 18    
Shani provides two closely related reasons for why he favours the priority monist framework 
above an existence monist framework, which maintains that ‘only one concrete particular’ 
exists. He first argues that the denial of the existence of parts of the cosmos is in conflict with 
common sense, as humans are predisposed to the beliefs: that the world consists of more than 
just one ‘concrete particular’ (basic entities), and that each individual person is regarded as a 
‘real-subject’ (Shani, 2015: p409). His second reason follows from the above, which argues 
that Panpsychism utilizes the notion of ‘subjectivity of ultimates’ in an attempt to explain the 
‘subjectivity and individuality of macro-subjects’, and that with this in mind, it would appear 
rather peculiar if a Cosmopsychist theory (which is a variant of a Panpsychist theory) were to 
result in a vastly distinct conclusion, whereby no objects nor subjects existed apart from the 
‘absolute’ (Shani, 2015: p409). From this, he concludes that the priority monist framework 
appears to be the more sensible choice for Cosmopsychists, as it allows one to maintain the 
notion of plurality with regards to subjects, alongside the claim that the absolute is the only 
ultimate subject and that all other subjects depend on the absolute for their existence (Shani, 
2015: p409).   
The third postulate of this theory is the lateral duality principle which states that the absolute 
is constituted of a dual nature. The concealed side is an inherent realm of creative activity 
which is in a state of constant change, and the revealed side is the exterior, which is 
characterized as the observable representation of the inner activity. 19  He states that these two 
dimensions are complimentary and that they can be seen as the ‘holistic’ equivalents of the 
distinction that is fundamental to Russellian Panpsychism, i.e., between quiddities and the 
observable entities that they ground (Shani, 2015: p410). The revealed realm of the absolute 
forms the structural outer appearance of the observable entities, which is what can be seen and 
measured by scientists, whereas the concealed realm coincides with a mysterious explicit realm 
                                            
17 See Shani (2015) footnote 20 for further explanation.    
18 See Sider (2007), Horgan and Potrč (2000, 2012), Kriegel (2012) for variations on Monism.   
19  For similar distinctions refer to Bohm (1980), De Chardin (1959), Hegel (1974), Spinoza (1677), Whorf 
(1950).   
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which grounds the observable system (Shani, 2015: p410). In a manner, this model supports a 
comprehensive rendition of the Russellian Panpsychist view. 20   
The fourth postulate of this theory suggests that the absolute is analogous to a “vast 
dynamically fluctuating ocean” (Shani, 2015: p411). Much like the previous postulate, this 
ocean consists of two complementary sides, being the concealed side and the revealed side. 
The concealed side is thought to be similar to that of the absolute’s constantly changing 
creative activity mentioned above, in that the ocean’s inner workings can be viewed similarly.  
The revealed side is thought to be similar to the absolute’s exterior, as it can be thought of as 
an observable representation of the inner activity occurring within the concealed realm of the 
ocean. As there is nothing over and above the absolute, Shani argues that the revealed side 
must be thought of as visible to observers and that it be created and situated within the ocean 
(cf. Mathews, 2011). To these observers, the revealed side appears to them as an extended 
form/structure within the ocean space, which changes over time and is distinctly structured 
into numerous stages and patterns. In other words, it appears to us as physical nature. In 
contrast, the concealed side is taken to be “an intrinsically sentient medium, a vast ocean of 
consciousness”, in that the phenomenal elements of this medium such as the “ebbs and flows 
of experience” moving through it, are private and mysterious (Shani, 2015: p411). Thus the 
analogy depicts how the absolute with its revealed and concealed realms are in a constant state 
of change, moving through various stages and creating various patterns/arrangements that 
appear to us as the physical changes we observe in nature.   
To put this simply, those who observe the absolute will see an imbalance between the revealed 
side and the concealed side as the methods of observation and examination that work for the 
one side/realm will not work for the other. Once again, Shani acknowledges the similarity of 
this view with that of the Russellian Panpsychist’s. He argues that both theories assume that 
the ultimates of reality are equipped with phenomenal properties, and that this is validated by 
the fact that it is influential in the explanation of macro-level consciousness without the use of 
emergence as an explanatory aid. Additionally he states that the logic which prompted 
Panpsychism as an alternative to Physicalism can be applied to Cosmopsychism as well (Shani, 
2015: p412).  
There is an important clarification that he makes at this point, which is that the distinction 
between the two sides (concealed/revealed) of reality do not add up to ontological dualism (the 
existence of two completely distinct realms of being that are sewed together). Instead, he 
argues that there is only one ocean which is an intrinsically sentient medium/ a sea of 
consciousness. This ocean space is a powerful entity, that holds continuous activity and diverse 
distribution of power, this in turn creates numerous “quasi-independent patterns and 
arrangements that co-evolve in mutual interaction.” (Shani, 2015: p412). In simpler terms, the 
revealed side of the absolute is the totality of all the inner environments, it is the absolute in 
its exterior appearance “complement to the subjective realities of created selves.” (Shani, 2015: 
p412).  
The fifth postulate, looks at the character of cosmic consciousness in connection with the 
consciousness of individual subjects (Shani, 2015: p412). With regards to the current model, 
                                            
20  For further clarification on this point, see Chalmers (2013), Seager (2006).   
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Shani suggests that cosmic consciousness appears to be equivalent to that of the Vedic notion 
of pure consciousness, as it functions as “the deeper layer of consciousness which grounds the 
specific streams of consciousness of individual creatures.” (Shani, 2015: p412). He thereby 
suggests that the connection between ‘cosmic consciousness and individual creature 
consciousness’ is one of partial grounding. Partial grounding in this instance is a type of 
grounding relation whereby the nature of the entity being grounded is not exhausted by its 
dependency relation, so for example if X partially grounds Y then that suggests that there is 
more to Y than just its dependence on X.     
For Shani cosmic consciousness can be compared to the vacuum in quantum field theory as 
the vacuum represents a space of constantly swarming activity. Similarly cosmic 
consciousness can be viewed in the same manner, as an inner area which is constantly 
swarming with activity and which could be described as “qualitative feel” (Shani, 2015: p412). 
Additionally, as the vacuum functions as a diverse sort of background whereby “local field 
excitations and patterns” are recognized as events and entities (the particles and systems of our 
world), we could think of cosmic consciousness in the same way as a background, whereby 
“local interference patterns” are recognized as phenomenal states (the states associated with 
individual creatures) (Shani, 2015: p413). In summary, what this model suggests is that the 
universal medium that grounds the specific states of consciousness of individual entities, is an 
intrinsically sentient medium, which Shani labels as “an endo-phenomenological expanse” 
(Shani, 2015: p413). What this translates to, is that the universal medium acts as a “locus of 
experience”, while simultaneously functioning as the “raw material” and the vessel that creates 
the visible, restricted states of consciousness of individual creatures (Shani, 2015: p413).   
The sixth postulate claims that individual entities (both the physical kind and the mental kind) 
are “dynamic creations within the absolute.” (Shani, 2015: p413). Shani mentions in a footnote, 
that even though the absolute is considered to be an ontological ultimate, that doesn’t 
necessarily mean it can’t be structured. 21 To be more specific, the sorts of things one generally 
classifies as objects, are in this case regarded as “meta-stable process configurations”, which 
are “cohesive entities in which opposing forces and tendencies are balanced and brought to 
equilibrium.” (Shani, 2015: p413). What this means is that all systems regardless of their 
stability and endurance are nothing but “dynamic differentiations” within the absolute (Shani, 
2015: p413). All are based on the fundamental flux from which they arose, and to which they 
eventually disintegrate (Shani, 2015: p413). Furthermore, no system is independent of outside 
influences, all are interconnected in a “continuous web of interrelationship.” (Shani, 2015: 
p413). Sometimes these connections are apparent such as those of an ecology, and sometimes 
they are undetectable such as the hidden connections that bind numerous particles together. 
However the point remains that no system is free from “internal (Constitutive) relations to 
other entities” (Shani, 2015: p414).   
The final postulate of this theory examines how (the manner in which) individual entities are 
related to the absolute (Shani, 2015: p414). Considering the metaphor for the absolute’s 
grounding relation is that of an ocean with “seamless” activity, how does one then explain the 
existence of individual entities? This aspect of Shani’s proposal closely resembles that of Freya 
Mathews’ theory in her work The Mental as Fundamental (2011), as she argues that we can 
                                            
21  See Shani (2015: p413) footnote 29.   
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make use of aquatic metaphors to help us in the comprehension of the notion of concrete 
individuals within an “underlying ontology of energy fields” (Shani, 2015: p414). Shani states 
here that one could think of local disturbances surging through the ocean as currents/ waves/ 
streams, among other things and that one could imagine that some of these could interfere to 
become vortices of enduring stability. Nevertheless, objects such as these are never entirely 
separable from the ocean or each other, as the whole is enmeshed in each and every condensed 
suborganization (Shani, 2015: p414). Before exploring Shani’s theory in more detail, it is 
important that we look at a few side notes that he mentions, as it will provide further clarity as 
we move forward with the theory.   
He begins by noting that his use of the term relative should be understood as any concrete 
system or object apart from the absolute itself, and that all individual subjects are relatives, but 
that not all relatives are subjects (Shani, 2015). What is meant by this, is that while some 
relatives are subjects others are non-subjects as they lack the interconnection of consciousness 
needed for them to be regarded as subjects (Shani, 2015: p415). In Shani’s view, non-subjects 
can be thought of as pure objects, which implies that they are devoid of “unified subjectivity”, 
but that their existence is not completely separated from consciousness (Shani, 2015: p415). 
Simply put, non-subjects lack that shared conscious connection with the absolute required for 
subjecthood, yet remain connected to the absolute in other ways. His final note at this point, is 
that his use of the term subjects should be viewed as reference to created subjects, which are 
all other subjects apart from the absolute. Now that we have explored the postulates put forth, 
we can move onto outlining a few related questions which act as explanatory tools that aid us 
in our journey to better understand Shani’s explanation of how macro-subjects could exist 
within the above set out theory. The questions that follow will set the stage for the rest of this 
section, as each contributes to the explanation of the most crucial question which is: how does 
Cosmopsychism justify the existence of macro-subjects?   
The list of questions can be viewed as follows:   
(1) “How do relatives arise from the absolute?”  
(2) Taking into account that relatives are comprised of a dual nature, how does one 
then justify the division between subjects and pure objects?   
(3) Provided the specific sort of causal organization required for the distinction 
between subjects and pure objects is present, how does Cosmopsychism then view 
the existence of microscopic entities, are they regarded as subjects or pure objects?    
(4) How does the theory set out above explain the existence of macrosubjects and its 
connection to the absolute? (Shani, 2015: p415).   
  
We turn now to the first of these questions, which looks at how relatives arise from the 
absolute. If one starts by concentrating on the revealed realm of said absolute, then a relative 
would, according to Shani appear as a ‘vortex’ gushing from the background of the ocean. He 
describes this as an interconnected system with a unique form, which is maintained through a 
powerful balance between “opposing forces and tendencies” (Shani, 2015: p416). This 
correlation along with the fact that the system creates a powerful organization (that is distinct 
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from its surroundings), distinguishes it as a “quasi-independent region”, in the same way that 
the edges of a vortex’s whorl distinguish a whirlpool from that of its surrounding environment 
(Shani, 2015: p416). As a result of this system being physically interconnected (in that the 
vortex forms a part of its surrounding environment, the ocean) as well as having its own distinct 
functions, it presents with what seems like an outer exposed facet.   
To the outside world, this can be thought of as a confined area of  “synchronized causal 
powers” (Shani, 2015: p416). This sort of principle can be applied to relatives on all levels of 
organization in the same way that they were applied above, by utilizing what Shani calls 
interference principles. Simply put, interference principles explain how one system relates to 
or works with another, as shown above, the interference principle explains how the vortex 
relates to the ocean, by examining the merging of ‘flow patterns’ (i.e. opposing forces and 
tendencies) (Shani, 2015: p416). According to Shani, one could apply this to the formation of 
complexed systems such as mega-‘vortices’ whereby coordinated groups of lower-level 
systems unite to create the complex whole.  
The above however only provides half of the picture as we have only looked at the revealed 
realm of the absolute. To get the complete picture we need to examine the concealed realm as 
well. One aspect of Shani’s theory assumes the lateral duality principle which states that no 
solid system is solely comprised of a revealed realm without the inclusion of an inner realm. 
Additionally, it holds that the revealed realm is grounded within the concealed and that this 
realm be regarded as a sentient medium, or as Shani refers to it “an endo-phenomenological 
expanse” (Shani, 2015: p416). Hence, all relatives can be regarded as habitats for 
consciousness, as no subject is an empty vessel devoid of inner experiential qualities 
(Whitehead, 1985). It should be noted here, that although relatives are regarded as habitats or 
homes for consciousness, this doesn’t imply that they themselves experience things.  
A more reasonable hypothesis according to Shani, is that whether or not a relative is equipped 
with consciousness, depends on the sort of causal organization it embodies (Shani, 2015: 
p417). Some types of organization facilitate the spread and combining of consciousness while 
other systems prevent this from occurring. The very notion that the “unity of consciousness” 
is somehow based on the combination of various states and processes, is customary within 
neuroscientific research pertaining to consciousness. However, this theory assumes that 
consciousness is primitive and that the proper processes (whatever they may be) within the 
concealed realm, simply sew the smaller bits of sentience together into larger and larger 
regions (Shani, 2015: p417).   
With the above in mind, we are led into our second question and subsequently the third. The 
second question looks at how one arrives at the distinction between subjects and pure objects 
when all relatives are comprised of the same dual nature, and the third question looks at how 
Cosmopsychism views the existence of microscopic entities, whether they are subjects or pure 
objects. In an attempt to provide clarification with regards to these questions, Shani provides 
us with the following explanation. If one refers to the example made earlier of a simple relative 
like that of a ‘vortex’, one would recall that systems such as these are distinct in terms of their 
functions and are thereby regarded as a separate system within the ocean. Shani suggests here 
that special focus be put on the fact that this division causes the sentient medium within the 
‘vortex’ to become uniquely organized (Shani, 2015: p418). What this aims to show us is that 
the uniquely organized sentience which belongs to the ‘vortex’ is derived from the mass 
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sentience of its surrounding environment (the ocean). This implies that the absolute (ocean) 
generates subjects with their own unique sentience, as opposed to pure objects that lack 
sentience of any kind. Additionally, he argues that this sort of organization of the inner 
conscious environment is mutually connected to the exposed structure as well as to the history 
of the system, and that as a result of this separation from its surroundings its experiential 
workings are also separated, creating patterns of its own that mirror and react to the conditions 
of the system (Shani, 2015: p418).   
What this means is that the above process consists in the amplification and organization of 
experience, while also concentrating it into a restricted space which results in the creation of 
a cluster of consciousness that appears to be self-contained with its inner reality separated from 
that of the oceans’ inner reality (Shani, 2015). Regardless of the fact that there is a deep 
connection between the ‘vortex’ and the ocean’s individual experiential niches, this relation is 
clouded by the “self-centred mental occupation” of the ‘vortex’, which gives rise to an 
“individual self” that is so overwhelmed by its own experiences that it becomes oblivious to 
the fact that there are deeper layers connecting it to that which grounds all things (Shani, 2015). 
Shani notes here that if one were to outline the problem of “unified subjectivity” in a way that 
compared whether or not one was able to successfully combine the experiential realms of 
microscopic elements into “macroscopic experiential wholes”, then one would be assuming 
that the most basic elements themselves are subjects of experience. As we have previously 
seen, this type of assumption forms the basis for most Panpsychist theories.  However, if one 
looks at the Cosmopsychist view one will notice that it is not taken for granted that microscopic 
entities are subjects of experience, as the most basic microscopic entities are considered to be 
derived from the absolute (Shani, 2015: p417).  
According to Shani, the above should demonstrate that the ‘derivation’ produces subjects 
instead of pure objects due to the absolute being a subject of experience in its own right (Shani, 
2015: p417). In simpler words, the Cosmopsychist theory views microscopic entities as being 
a part of the absolute, which suggests that the absolute produces smaller level subjects which 
are already endowed with consciousness, as opposed to pure objects that are devoid of it. The 
reason for this is due to the smaller level subjects being derived from the consciousness bearing 
absolute. What this explanation suggests is that simple relatives are real subjects, however 
when it comes to explaining whether complex relatives are subjects or pure objects the method 
of explanation varies slightly. If one recalls, the current hypothesis argues that some complex 
relatives possess an interconnected consciousness, while other complex relatives do not. The 
reason for this difference according to Shani, lies in the specific ways in which these systems 
are organized. He argues that this notion, of organization being the answer to why some macro-
level subjects possess subjectivity while others do not, appears to be an indisputable point 
(Shani, 2015: p419).   
In order to elaborate on this, Shani provides us with an example of the real Queen Elizabeth 
and her Madame Tussauds’ replica, to illustrate the point that there are “fundamental 
differences between animate and inanimate objects” such as the real Queen possessing 
consciousness, while the replica is devoid of consciousness (Shani, 2015: p419) He argues that 
if one were to take the “componential analysis” further, one would find it incredibly difficult 
to pin point the differences between the “subatomic components” comprising the Queen and 
that of her replica (Shani, 2015: p419). What this suggests is that material constitution is not 
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enough to generate consciousness (otherwise the replica would be considered conscious 
alongside the real queen), rather it is the sort of organization that plays the pivotal role in 
explaining the difference. The use of the term organization in this instance is meant to refer to 
the manner in which the various components of a specific system are arranged. An additional 
reason provided for the significance of organization is that, in assuming that consciousness 
exists in all things along with the notion that simple subjects are relatives, one is required to 
explain how in some cases consciousness increases leading up to macrolevel subjectivity and 
in other cases one is left with macro-level subjects that lack subjectivity (Shani, 2015: p419). 
To elaborate on this very point, Shani introduces new terminology to distinguish between two 
broad categories of interconnected “macro-level compound systems” (Shani, 2015: p419).   
The first of these are esonectic systems (from eso meaning inner and nexus meaning 
connection) which are whole systems whose micro-elements are interconnected in a way that 
the system is connected externally and internally. These are systems that are internally 
interconnected which means that the “endo-phenomenological” supply of micro-elements 
unite in a ‘coherent’ manner in order to generate a unified experiential realm (Shani, 2015: 
p419). Shani’s use of the term “endo-phenomenological” should be understood as a systems’/ 
subjects inner experiences. The second of these are exonectic systems (from exo meaning outer 
and nexus meaning connection) which are systems whose micro-elements are interconnected 
in a way that the system is only connected on the external side, it is devoid of a macro-level 
inner realm to correlate with its external realm. The endophenomenological supply of micro-
elements remain separated from one another and thus do not combine, which leaves us with a 
system lacking in subjectivity and whose demeanour gives no sign that it contains 
compartments of consciousness within its centre (Shani, 2015: p420). To put this simply, 
esonectic systems communicate with authentic macro-level subjects, while exonectic systems 
communicate with pure objects (Shani, 2015: p420).   
Shani admits here that the above is speculative, as there are currently no available theories to 
prove or disprove it. However, he argues that regardless of this fact, the above provides a 
general framework for the development of a potential theory. It also provides an opportunity 
to explain how the existence of non-conscious subjects could fit into a Panpsychist or  
Cosmopsychist theory, which suggests that it should not be easily dismissed (Shani, 2015: 
p420). To further support his point, Shani argues that the above division corresponds with the 
empirical knowledge we have of characteristic differences in material organization between 
conscious entities such as organisms that have a brain and non-conscious entities such as 
minerals (Shani, 2015: p420). Once again, to fully understand this Shani provides another 
example for clarification.   
He begins by examining the structure of minerals, stating that their composition is comprised 
of crystalline formations that are consistent and repetitive in nature. Their structural bonds 
which bind the various elements together are incredibly strong and communication between 
these various separated elements are non-existent. Contrary to this, when examining 
organisms, the characteristic features of biological brains and bodies are completely different 
to that of minerals. Organisms have a wide range of structural and functional elements, fragile 
structural bonds and a huge amount of communication between elements all over the system 
(Shani, 2015: p421). These features are all considered to be essential for macrolevel 
consciousness, as Shani argues that “weak structural bonds are necessary for flexible 
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modification, regulation and adaptation of processes, activities, and behaviours; while the 
combination of differentiation (through structural and functional variability) and integration 
(through global resonance and information transfer) is considered by many leading researchers 
to be a key characteristic of consciousness.” (Shani, 2015: p421). 22 According to Shani, these 
differences imply that there are principled reasons for why one should expect consciousness 
to build up in humans and animals but not in minerals.   
Even though this distinction is considered speculative, Shani argues that it is a natural 
distinction to make when working within a broad Panpsychist framework, as this distinction 
makes sense when referring to what we know about the nature and extent of the differences 
between living subjects and inanimate objects’ structure and dynamics (Shani, 2015:p422). 
According to Shani, when one accepts this notion, it allows us to work our way back to the 
explanation of macro-level subjectivity, thus leading us into the fourth question.  
In Shani’s view, esonectic binding could assist in explaining how macro-level relatives with 
unified phenomenal fields arise, however he states that this does not completely tackle the 
crucial problem of defending the notion that “the existence of individual conscious 
perspectives in macro-level subjects depends on the fact that the ultimates of concrete reality 
are themselves subjects, and as such, the owners of individual perspectives.” (Shani, 2015: 
p422). To frame this in terms of Cosmopsychism, one could look at it as the problem of having 
to show how the absolute being endowed with a perspective, grounds the fact that relative 
subjects such as humans for example are endowed with their own individual perspectives 
(Shani, 2015: p422). We are presented with an outline for Shani’s argument at this point, where 
the first fact AP refers to the absolute’s perspective and the second fact RP refers to the relative 
subjects’ perspective. In the following, Shani tries to defend the notion that AP is a partial 
ground for RP (Shani, 2015:p422).   
When saying that AP is a partial ground for RP what is implied, is that although RP is 
dependent on AP, there is more to RP than just it’s “dependency” relation, as its nature is not 
exhausted by this relationship (Shani, 2015). This occurrence is to be expected when a 
particular component within a relative subjects’ perspective is anchored in the absolute’s 
perspective, and when another component affirms its “independence.” (Shani, 2015:p423). 
Shani states that the dialectic set out above, holistically explains the situation which lies before 
us.    
Within the above, each perspective of each relative subject bears what Shani refers to as 
“specific character”, which is to be understood as a “unique individual profile” that is not 
obtained from another perspective nor a combination of perspectives. It also bears a “generic 
character” which can be thought of as a “basic template” which is obtained from the subjective 
perspective nature of the absolute (Shani, 2015:p423). With regards to the “generic character” 
every conscious perspective of every relative subject is grounded in the fact that the absolute 
is a subject, and that it has a firstperson perspective. With regards to the “specific character” 
on the other hand, it is regarded as an independent entity which does not ground any other 
perspective nor is it grounded by other perspectives (Shani, 2015: p423). In Shani’s view, this 
dialectic provides one with a strong “blueprint” for tackling Coleman’s combination dilemma, 
                                            
22 For further explanation, refer to Tononi (2012) and Shani (2015).   
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as it allows one to retain the claim that no perspective is a part of another perspective, and that 
AP is a vital explanatory tool for RP.   
 
To fully understand this, Shani suggests that more be said with regards to the distinction 
between specific and generic character. The specific character of P (perspective) is it’s 
differentiated form, which is a solid pattern of interconnected relationships that P incorporates, 
and which separates it from every other perspective. Every subjective perspective is comprised 
of a “unique outlook”, in that it has “a singular way of relating to things from an intentional 
conscious standpoint: of perceiving, feeling, categorizing, synthesizing, anticipating, 
evaluating, selecting, preparing for action, and so on.” (Shani, 2015: p423). This way of 
deliberately relating to things, is brought about by the synchronized network of interconnected 
dispositions, which aids it in retaining its structural form over time (Shani, 2015: p423). As 
such, Shani suggests that each subject is equipped with a perspective whose specific character 
is unique, which results in it being singled out from every other subject. The very fact that each 
individual perspective is distinguished based on its characteristic form, is what makes it vital 
in trying to explain why perspectives don’t combine according to Shani. For us to understand 
how this works, Shani asks us to recall the combination problem in terms of perspectives. He 
sets out the argument as follows:   
“Suppose that a given perspective P is a compound made of other, more limited 
perspectives, say Q and R. This seems to imply that viewing reality from viewpoint P 
consists, in part, in viewing reality from viewpoint Q. The trouble, however, is that the 
vista which P opens up transcends the limitations (or boundaries) of viewpoint Q, and 
therefore that it presupposes the elimination of such limitations. Thus, on the 
assumption that Q is a compositional component of P, it follows that Q must both be 
present and absent – a contradiction.” (Shani, 2015: p424).   
In Shani’s view, every perspective can be thought of as an opening from a specific point, and 
that the way in which this opening is formed, is what gives it its structure, and defines how 
things are perceived from this specific point. In other words, Shani suggests that one could 
“think of a perspective as an angle whose point of origin is its vertex and whose form is limited 
by the rays emanating from that vertex.” (Shani, 2015: p424). He argues here that if the 
perspective has proper parts, then those parts would have to correlate with a division of the 
original angle which could be represented as a ray on the interior. He provides a useful 
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The above is intended to show us that perspective P which is represented as the original 90˚ 
angle, is free from any limitations in terms of its specific outlook/view, as it is not comprised 
of any components. This however changes when one introduces the notion of components 
represented by Q, as it possesses its own unique outlook which automatically generates a 
limitation (represented by the middle ray) excluding the possibility of having outlook P-Q.   
What this leaves us with is a contradiction, as we now have a situation where there is an 
inclusion of a perspective Q, as well as an exclusion of a perspective P-Q. To put Shani’s point 
simply, this illustration is meant to show us that subjective perspectives are what he calls 
“gestalts”, which are structural compounds that cannot be explained by reference to the 
combination of its various components/parts, and his reason for this is that when working with 
perspectives, the existence of parts excludes the existence of the whole (Shani, 2015: p425). 
The reason behind this, as shown above is due to the fact that by introducing a component/part, 
one introduces a limitation that was not previously there, thereby eliminating the existence of 
the whole/ original perspective. Should this argument prove sound, then that entails that 
perspectives by nature prevent the existence of precise compositional relations between 
perspectives.  
However, this does not imply that all relatives are dependent on the perspectival nature of the 
absolute for their existence, as Shani argues that the notion of generic character can aid us in 
this regard (Shani, 2015: p425). If one recalls the definition of “generic character” provided 
above, one would remember that this notion assigns a set of common features to all 
perspectives, and that without these features there would be no perspectives at all. From this it 
follows that all relative selves acquire the generic character of their individual perspectives 
from the absolute, as the absolute itself possesses its own perspective and is considered the 
birthplace of the individual selves (Shani, 2015: p425). To demonstrate this idea, Shani 
presents the following two basic features which he considers to be generic, whilst emphasizing 
the way in which each feature could be viewed as emerging from the subjective type nature of 
the absolute.  
The first generic feature according to Shani is sentience, and the reason for this is that each 
perspective requires an indication that it contains sentience due to the fact that each individual 
has their own way of experiencing reality. However, without the absolute’s intrinsic capability 
for experience there wouldn’t be individual experiences for relative subjects to have and 
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therefore no individual perspectives (Shani, 2015: 426). The second generic feature according 
to Shani is what he terms “core-subjectivity”. This can be thought of as the point of origin that 
a perspective has which is what gives it its unique outlook on the world. Within 
phenomenological literature, this point of origin is identified as ipseity or I-ness, which is used 
to refer to a sense of self or the “who” that receives certain things or experiences. 23 (Shani, 
2015: p426).  
When this is then combined with Cosmopsychism, the ultimate source of self or the I-ness that 
lies at the core of each relative perspective, is then the absolute’s own core-selfhood (Shani, 
2015: p426). Shani suggests that the general idea can be explained in the following way: to 
begin, it is assumed that the absolute’s cosmic consciousness is a medium of subjective 
receptivity. When a relative is created within the absolute, this receptivity of the “oceanic 
consciousness” is transmitted to the relative, and it is topped off with a subjective realm (ability 
to experience things as an individual self). Yet, “each relative has a mind of its own”, a 
spatiotemporally enclosed web of organized mental activity with an I-ness that has a “unique 
perspective.” (Shani, 2015: p426). As a result of this, there is an automatic captivation that 
occurs with “the transformations, contents and interests” of the I-ness that it ends up creating 
a veil which conceals the connection to the cosmic consciousness which grounds all relative 
subjects and secures them together (Shani, 2015: p427). Taking this into consideration, what 
is suggested here is that the subjective receptivity which lies at the core of the individual’s 
consciousness, is forced to function as a restricted I-ness that acts as the receiver of the 
experiences of said subject. As such, each relative subject has what Shani calls “an individual 
sense of selfhood” regardless of the fact that all “core-selves” are grounded in one massive 
“universal selfhood”. 24 (Shani, 2015: p427).   
At this point, Shani entertains the objection that the notion of “core-selfhood makes all subjects 
dissolve in the absolute”, which suggests that there is only one subject – being the absolute 
and that it has “multiple windows on the world” (Shani, 2015: p427). Shani’s response to this 
is that the theory which he has provided does enough to alleviate this concern. Regardless of 
the fact that relative subjects are grounded in the absolute, they are still considered real as they 
have minds of their own which contain all the normal features of individual subjects, such as 
“private experiences, unique epistemic outlooks and a core sense of self” which aligns with 
“private mental realities.” (Shani, 2015:p427). Additionally, Shani argues that under normal 
conditions “there is an epistemic barrier” which precludes relative subjects from wondering 
whether they are anything over and above this perceived separated self (Shani, 2015: p427). 
The reason for this is that they view themselves as being distinctly separate from one another 
and from pure objects. Aside from this, Shani states that he cannot see further reason for 
concern, as Cosmopsychism is committed to ontological priority, which should not be 
understood as ontological exclusivity. To put this simply, Cosmopsychism does not assume 
that the cosmos is the only ontological entity to exist, but instead argues that the cosmos was 
the first entity to exist and that there are other entities which exist apart from it, and are 
dependent on the cosmos in some manner.   
                                            
23  For more on this concept one can refer to Sokolowski (2000, 112) and Zahavi (2005, 124-125).   
24 Shani mentions here that this concept resembles that of a classical Hindu doctrine regarding Atman, and 
that there is also similarity to Teilhard de Chardin’s notion of a cosmic conscious centre. (1959, 262).   
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In summary, Shani states that the debate of sentience and core-subjectivity demonstrates that 
in alignment with Cosmopsychism, all perspectives obtain their “generic character from the 
subjectival nature of the absolute” (Shani, 2015: p428). Simultaneously, each perspective is 
endowed with a specific character which cannot be derived from another perspective or 
combination of perspectives. As such, we are left with Shani’s completed argument that AP is 
a partial ground for RP. This also demonstrates that Cosmopsychism is an adaptation of 
foundational Panpsychism (FPP) and that it is positioned in between Constitutive 
Panpsychism (CPP) and Emergentist Panpsychism (EPP). What can be concluded from the 
above, is that this theory provides a response to Coleman’s problem, thus providing an 
opportunity to tackle the subject combination problem. The final point that Shani makes refers 
to what he terms the “explanatory profile, power and promise” of the theory, which is how it 
handles the problems faced by Constitutive Panpsychists, with particular focus on the subject-
combination problem (Shani, 2015: p428). In Shani’s view the solution to this problem should 
be evident, as the Cosmopsychist framework developed and which we have just examined, 
assumes that there are “no compositional relations between subjective perspectives”, which 
results in there being no such problem simply because it does not arise (Shani, 2015: p428).   
In summary, the theory presented here appears to be what Shani refers to as a “holistic 
alternative” to that of atomistic Panpsychism, as it states that there is only one ultimate “the 
absolute cosmic consciousness”, and it aims to provide an explanation for how macro-level 
consciousness could be rooted within the cosmos’ consciousness (Shani, 2015: p 431). 
According to Shani, this theory is powered by the idea that a holistic approach is supported by 
both the scientific and philosophic communities, and that it is influential in standing up to the 
famously arduous subject combination problem. What we are then left with, is a theory which 
moves away from modern-day Panpsychism in that it rejects the Constitutive and Emergentist 
type Panpsychism, while defending the view of Foundational Panpsychism (Shani, 2015: 
p432). With a clearer understanding of Shani’s theory, we are now able to delve into the 
specifics of Philip Goff’s adaptation of Cosmopsychism.  
  
(5.4) PHILP GOFF’S CONSTITUTIVE COSMOPSYCHISM  
Goff (2017) begins the defence of his version of Cosmopsychism with a few background 
assumptions before addressing the core argument, much like Shani did in the theory we just 
examined. Once again, in order to fully comprehend this version of Cosmopsychism, it is 
imperative that we address these assumptions as each one provides an important puzzle piece 
which consecutively leads us to an overall picture.   
The first of these assumptions is Phenomenal Transparency, which is the notion that 
phenomenal concepts divulge the core of the states which they represent (Goff, 2017: p 107). 
According to Goff, we are in a special epistemic situation when it comes to our conscious 
states, as we are able to observe the conscious state which we are in, and we are able to form 
a “direct phenomenal concept” of this state by directly addressing it (Goff, 2017: p107). 24 By 
having this “direct phenomenal concept”, the specific conscious state being addressed is 
directly presented to us in a way that (i) the entire nature of the sort to which this state belongs 
                                            
24  The idea of “direct phenomenal concept” is attributed to Chalmers (2003).   
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is made evident to us, and (ii) we are able to know for certain or “something close to it” that 
the specific conscious state exists (Goff, 2017; p107). An example would be when one 
addresses a certain pain and creates a direct phenomenal concept about this pain. Due to this 
pain being directly presented to you, you would know (i) exactly how it feels for someone else 
to feel this pain, and (ii) you would know with certainty “or something close to it” that you 
yourself are feeling that exact pain (Goff, 2017:p107). This is an example of the hypothesis 
termed “Revelation”. 25 Goff notes here that the revelation hypothesis should not be viewed in 
the same manner as phenomenal transparency, regardless of the fact that the former brings 
about a form of the latter. As mentioned above, phenomenal transparency is the view that 
phenomenal concepts divulge the core of the states which they represent, in contrast to 
revelation which looks at the nature of a specific conscious state in terms of it being directly 
given to the subject. In accordance with this hypothesis, when one addresses a specific 
conscious state under a direct phenomenal concept, then the entire nature of the sort to which 
this state belongs is made evident to you which results in “Direct Phenomenal Transparency: 
the thesis that direct phenomenal concepts are transparent.” (Goff, 2017: p107). The definition 
Goff provides us with to further explain transparency can be viewed as follows:   
Transparent Concept: A concept C of entity E is transparent just in case C reveals the 
nature of E (i.e. what it is for E to be part of reality is a priori accessible for someone 
possessing C, in virtue of possessing C): for example, <sphericity> and <party> 26 
(Goff, 2017: p74).  
The second assumption of this theory is ANTI-PHYSICALISM. From what we have 
previously seen, Physicalism is a theory which states that fundamental reality is completely 
physical (Goff, 2017:p14). As a theory this comes in a variety of forms which is why for 
simplicity sake Goff utilizes what he terms “pure physicalism” in his initial arguments, which 
states that the entire nature of fundamental reality can generally be captured in the workings 
of the physical sciences (Goff, 2017: p14).Goff’s argument against physicalism is one that we 
have touched on in a previous section of this paper, which is that physicalism is incapable of 
explaining the existence of consciousness. Recall that the most popular arguments against 
physicalism are the knowledge argument and the conceivability argument (already discussed 
in section 1.1 above) which is meant to show us that there is more to conscious experience 
than what physical science is capable of explaining. Goff suggests that there are problematic 
areas within these traditional arguments and that in order to fix these errors, one needs to 
incorporate a commitment to the thesis of “Phenomenal Transparency” (Goff, 2017: p15). 27   
                                            
25  The term “Revelation” can be traced back to Mark Johnston’s (1992) description of Galen Strawson’s (1989) 
view on the nature of colour, and it was later utilized in the mind-body debate with regards to the nature of 
experience.  Goff mentions that his use of the term here is meant to be more specific.   
26 Goff notes that “P can be a priori accessible for X even if X is not intelligent enough to access P as intuitively 
the thought would be that if X had sufficient rational powers then X would be able to access P. If the worry of 
how to define idealized rational powers emerges then one could simply alter the definition to the following: a 
concept C referring to entity E is transparent just in case there is a possible world in which someone works out 
the essence of E a priori, in virtue of possessing C, and without any empirical information other than what is 
required to possess C.” (Goff, 2017: p74).   
27  It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine all of these arguments in turn, so for more information 
regarding the various ways in which to fix the knowledge argument and conceivability argument refer to Goff 
(2017: p23).  
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His particular argument against physicalism differs from what we have already examined and 
as such requires its own exploration. In order to fully comprehend how transparency leads us 
to an anti-physicalist argument, we must first examine the notions of transparent and opaque 
concepts. According to Goff, a concept is deemed “transparent just in case it reveals the nature 
of the entity it refers to”, in a way that is a priori (Goff, 2017: p15). An example is the idea of 
sphericity. For the property of sphericity to be represented is for there to be something in which 
all points on the surface are equally distant from its centre (Goff, 2017: p16). Having this 
concept in mind suggests that one should be able to figure out a priori what sphericity is by 
utilizing what one already knows. In contrast, a concept is considered opaque when “it reveals 
little or nothing about the nature of the entity it’s referring to” according to Goff. In other 
words “very little of what it is for that entity to be part of reality is a priori accessible.” (Goff, 
2017: p16). The notion of water is an example of an opaque concept, as the prerequisite for 
something to be water is that it is composed of H 2 O molecules. This cannot be deduced a 
priori as one would need to scientifically examine water in order to discover what the nature 
of water really is (Goff, 2017). 
As mentioned above, Phenomenal Transparency is when phenomenal concepts divulge the 
nature of the conscious states they are referring to. When one thinks about a certain pain with 
regards to what it is like, one is able to know what it is like for that pain to exist. In this way 
the concept of pain is similar to that of the sphericity example as opposed to that of the water. 
Let us examine what would happen if we applied the above to a physicalist argument. Consider 
the fact that physicalists believe that a physical pain has a completely physical nature, and that 
for something to feel pain is for its c-fibers to be firing. If one assumes that phenomenal 
concepts are transparent then the physical nature of pain would be accessible to anyone who 
has experienced pain, therein having a phenomenal concept of this pain. Just by having this 
experience of pain, it would allow one to know that for something to experience this particular 
pain, that specific something’s c-fibers would need to be firing. According to Goff this isn’t 
the case, as feeling this pain doesn’t reveal the physical nature of that pain, which suggests that 
physicalism is false. If one secures Phenomenal Transparency then one has a solid argument 
against physicalism in Goff’s view. 28 It is worth mentioning before heading into the argument, 
that Goff views the concept pure/A-type physicalism as physicalism (in the general sense), in 
addition to the notion that fundamental reality is completely comprised of ‘pure physical facts’, 
in the sense that these facts are entirely expressed in ‘the mathematico-nomic vocabulary of 
physics’. With this in mind, Goff provides the following transparency argument against 
physicalism.   
 
The transparency argument against pure/type-A physicalism  
Premise 1: If Direct Phenomenal Transparency and either pure physicalism or type-A 
physicalism are true, then phenomenal concepts reveal their referents to be pure 
physical states.   
                                            
28  For further clarification on the various ways to secure phenomenal transparency refer to Goff (2017).   
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Premise 2: If phenomenal concepts reveal their referents to be pure physical states, 
then there is no epistemic gap between the pure physical and the experiential.  
Premise 3: There is an epistemic gap between the pure physical and the experiential.   
Conclusion 1: Therefore, either Direct Phenomenal Transparency is false, or pure 
physicalism and type-A physicalism are false.   
Conclusion 2: Pure physicalism and type-A physicalism are false.  
(Goff, 2017: p124). 29  
 
When one accepts the above assumptions, one obtains strong grounds for accepting the third 
assumption of this theory which is the irreducibility of subjects. In Goff’s view, Subject 
Irreducibility represents the following thesis: “What it is for there to be a conscious subject S 
cannot be analysed into facts not involving S.” This thesis states that “there are no deflationary 
analyses of subjecthood.” (Goff, 2017: p209) The official definition which Goff provides can 
be viewed as follows:     
General Form of a Deflationary Analysis of Subjecthood-For it to be the case that there 
is a conscious subject X is for it to be the case that there are Y’s that are F, where X 
need not be one of the Y’s (or for it to be the case that there is a Y that is F, where X 
need not be identical with Y) (Goff, 2017: p210).  
A simple example used to clarify this idea compares the above to a case where deflationary 
analysis is possible.  
Deflationary Analysis of Partyhood- For it to be the case that there is a party is for it to 
be the case that there are people revelling (Goff, 2017: p210).  
This analysis defines what is required for there to be a party in terms of things which are not 
that party. Subject Irreducibility suggests that the above cannot be done with subjects as we 
are unable to analyse what it is for a particular subject to exist with regards to things which are 
not that particular subject (Goff, 2017).   
What this shows us is that physicalists are unable to provide deflationary explanations of 
subjecthood. With this in mind Goff examines whether or not Russellian Monists could offer 
a deflationary explanation. He begins by defining the sort of deflationary analysis required for 
subjecthood, which appears as follows:  
General Form of a Deflationary Analysis of Subjecthood – For it to be the case that there is a 
conscious subject X is for it to be the case that there are Y’s that are F, where X need not be 
one of the Y’s (or for it to be the case that there is a Y that is F, where X need not be identical 
with Y) (Goff, 2017: p211). Under the Russellian Monist banner, the micropsychist could 
present with the following response:  
Micropsychist Analysis- For it to be the case that there is a conscious  
                                            
29  This argument can be applied to weaker forms of physicalism. For more information on these arguments refer 
to Goff (2017).   
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subject X is for it to be the case that there are micro-subjects S 1 ,  
S 2 . . . S n , none of which is identical with X, standing in n-place relation R (Goff, 2017: 
p211).  
However, Goff suggests that the problem with this analysis is that it appears to be incomplete 
due to the fact that it is unable to explain what exactly the R relation is. If one were to adopt 
Phenomenal Transparency then the relation required would have to be a priori. According to 
Goff, ‘armchair reflection’ with regards to subjecthood does not divulge the a priori relation 
needed (Goff, 2014: p212). If one took it for granted that the relation was indeed a priori, then 
that would suggest that in some indirect sense, this is what one means when affirming the 
existence of a conscious subject. Goff poses the question: what is it for one to judge that there 
is a conscious subject, who he calls Jane? He argues that it appears unlikely that one would 
refer to a large amount of micro-subjects which are packed together in some or other relation 
as the explanation for this particular judgement, especially when one considers that these 
micro-subjects are not identical with the conscious Jane. When one takes into account that this 
is a general analysis of what is required for subjecthood, then one would realize that this sort 
of analysis could be applied to the micro-subjects themselves, as the existence of each micro-
subject would be comprised of additional microsubjects packed together in relation R, and 
each of those micro-subjects would further be comprised of more micro-subjects packed 
together in relation R and so the cycle appears never ending. From this Goff argues that 
something has gone terribly wrong, suggesting that an alternative analysis is required.  
Another possible option is to look at the Panpsychists response, which provides an analysis 
based on the experiences of micro-subjects. The question posed to Panpsychists is: what sort 
of relation could tie experiences together to form a subject? One possible response that Goff 
suggests, is to appeal to the relation of co-consciousness provided by Barry Dainton. This is 
“the relation two experiences bear to each other when they are experienced together.” 
(Dainton, 2011a). The following analysis utilizes this very notion.  
Co-Consciousness Analysis (1 s t formulation) - For it to be the case that there is a 
conscious subject is for it to be the case that there are certain experiences that are co-
conscious with each other (Goff, 2017: p212).  
In utilizing this analysis, the Panpsychist could argue that (i) a large amount of the experiences 
experienced by the micro-subjects which comprise one’s brain, possess the co-consciousness 
relationship to each other and that (ii) it is in light of this very fact that one’s conscious mind 
exists. What this appears to do, is analyse subjects into experiences. However, in order to 
assess this claim one needs to examine what exactly an experience is. Goff refers to work by 
Martina Nida-Rϋmelin, which states that phenomenal reflection shows us that “an experience 
is merely an event of a certain subject bearing certain experiential properties.” (Goff, 2017: 
p213). When one thinks about this in terms of someone experiencing pain, then all that would 
be required for that pain to exist is for it to be the case that someone is feeling that particular 
pain at a particular time. If this is true then experiences are analysed in terms of subjects, which 
undermines the claim above that subjects could be analysed into experiences (Goff, 2017). 
Much like the first formulation, the second and third appear unable to provide a suitable 
deflationary analysis of subjecthood, which leaves the Russellian Monist with no further 
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options. 30 Once one dismisses the possible physicalist analyses, then it becomes evident that 
there are no further options with regards to “an a priori accessible deflationary analysis of 
subjecthood” (Goff, 2017: p214). While Goff admits it would be unfair to expect the 
Constitutive Russellian Monist to present us with ‘precise necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the instantiation of subjecthood’, he rightly argues that it is reasonable enough to request 
some sort of indication as to what might be required.   
 
However, when reflecting on the sorts of properties which we have a transparent conception 
of, (regardless of the fact that it is usually problematic when attempting to determine the 
requirements needed for there to be a “token of the property as precise necessary and sufficient 
conditions”), one can still generate a rough estimate of what would be required (Goff, 2017: 
p215). Simply put, in order for there to be a party, one would roughly need a group of people 
congregating together with the intention of having a good time. This simple definition attempts 
to convey the notion that it is possible to have an idea of how an entity could be constitutively 
grounded in more fundamental features (Goff, 2017). Yet when it comes to the notion of 
subjecthood, it appears as though one is not able to offer even the slightest indication as to 
what the deflationary analysis of this might be, further suggesting that there is no amount of 
meticulous examination which could produce such an analysis according to Goff. It is at this 
point that he offers us the following argument for Subject Irreducibility:  
    The argument for Subject Irreducibility  
Premise 1- If the analysis of subjecthood is a priori, then it is deflationary only if 
analytic functionalism is true.  
Premise 2- Analytic Functionalism is false.  
Premise 3- The analysis of subjecthood is a priori (implied by Phenomenal 
Transparency).  
Conclusion- The analysis of subjecthood is not deflationary (i.e., Subject Irreducibility) 
(Goff, 2017: p216).  
The reason why this is relevant is due to the fact that constitutive Russellian Monism is 
regarded as a form of constitutive grounding, which according to Goff can be understood in 
terms of grounding by analysis. From the argument just examined, this would rule out 
constitutive Russellian Monism. To fully understand how grounding by analysis works, let us 
examine the specific details.   
Fact X is grounded by analysis in fact Y iff:  
• X is grounded in Y, and  
• Y logically entails what is essentially required for the entities contained in X (including 
property and kind instances) to be part of reality (Goff, 2017:p216).  
Returning to the example of a party: the fact (F1) that there is a party is grounded by analysis 
in the fact (F2) that Rod, Jane, and Freddy are revelling because:  
                                            
30  For more on the other possible formulations refer to Goff (2017: p 213).   
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• F1 is grounded in F2, and  
• The fact that Rod, Jane, and Freddy are revelling logically entails what is essentially 
required for a party to exist, that is, that there are people revelling (Goff, 2017:p216).  
What the above implies is that the existence of a conscious subject (Jane) is grounded by 
analysis in the micro-level facts only if her non-existence is logically inconsistent with the 
obtaining of the micro-level facts (Goff, 2017: p217). According to Goff however, the problem 
with this is that compositional nihilism (the notion that there are no objects with proper parts) 
is logically coherent. There appears to be nothing incoherent in the idea that there are particles 
organized “table-wise, planet-wise and so on, but there are no tables, planets, and so on.” (Goff, 
2017: p217). In light of this, Goff argues that if one assumes that o-subjects (organic conscious 
subjects) are macrolevel entities, then one is able to form the following argument against 
constitutive Russellian Monism:  
  
The Subject Irreducibility argument against constitutive Russellian Monism  
Premise1- The fact that Jane exists as a conscious subject is grounded by analysis in 
the micro-level facts only if the micro-level facts logically entail what is essentially 
required for Jane to exist as a conscious subject. (This premise follows from the 
definition of grounding by analysis).  
Premise2- (Subject Irreducibility) - What is essentially required for there to be an x 
such that x is a conscious individual cannot be analysed into facts not involving x.   
Conclusion1- The fact that Jane exists as a conscious subject can be grounded by 
analysis in the micro-level facts only if the micro-level facts logically entail the 
existence of Jane.  
Premise3- Jane is a macro-level entity, and hence her non-existence is logically 
consistent with the complete micro-level facts.   
Conclusion2- The fact that Jane exists is not grounded by analysis in the micro-level 
facts (Goff, 2017: p217).  
The aim of this argument is to show us that the nature of subjecthood cannot be explained in 
terms of deflationary analysis, hence there is no way in which to utilize grounding by analysis. 
This however does not affect emergentist forms of Russellian Monism as they argue that 
conscious subjects are “fundamental and unanalyzeable” (Goff, 2017: p219). 31  
The Constitutive Russellian Monist is now left with a serious challenge, one that cannot be 
solved with traditional forms of grounding as we have just seen. As such, Goff suggests that 
what is needed is a theory that will incorporate the notions of (i) conscious subjects being 
irreducible, as well as (ii) the notion of conscious subjects being non-fundamental (as they are 
grounded in more fundamental facts). It is this which then leads us into the next assumption of 
Goff’s theory.  
                                            
31  For more on the emergentist option, refer to Goff (Forthcoming).   
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The fourth assumption introduces an alternative to grounding by analysis in the form of 
“grounding by subsumption.” (Goff, 2017: p220). With this Goff hopes to find a way of 
grounding conscious subjects, whilst also providing a logical form of constitutive Russellian 
Monism. Grounding by subsumption in the initial sense is a relation between entities according 
to Goff. 32 The definition which he provides for this relation can be viewed as follows:  
“Entity X grounds by subsumption entity Y iff (i) X grounds Y, and (ii) X is a unity of 
which Y is an aspect” (Goff, 2017: p221).   
It should be noted that Goff’s use of the terms “unity” and “aspect” are meant to be understood 
as primitives, thereby not requiring further analysis. In order to comprehend this notion he 
provides us with four examples, of which we need only examine two. The first of these looks 
at grounding by subsumption of Hue, Saturation and Lightness in Colour. If one takes a 
particular shade of orange (Goff refers to it as orange 7) – it would involve a red hue and a 
yellow hue, as well as some degree of saturation and some degree of lightness. One could view 
orange 7 as a mixed property comprised of red and yellow hues, as well as particular degrees 
of saturation and lightness. In other words, one could understand orange 7 to be a “unified 
property” whereby the above components are regarded as aspects (Goff, 2017: p221). Goff 
states here that if one is able to grasp this example, then one should be able to comprehend 
how “hue, saturation and lightness are grounded by subsumption in instances of color” (Goff, 
2017: p221).  
The second example looks at grounding by subsumption of regions of space in the whole of 
space. To fully understand this example, we need to begin by referring to some background 
information. When exploring the philosophy of space, one is met with a chief debate amongst 
substantivalists and relationists. The substantivalists argue that “at the fundamental level, 
space (or spacetime, or regions of space/spacetime) exists as an entity in its own right” (Goff, 
2017: p223). A theological metaphor which Goff provides suggests that when God created the 
world, she first created space (the great container) and then she created all the things in space 
such as the stars and planets and so on. In contrast, the relationist argues that God’s only duty 
was to create the stars and the planets, and to make sure that they held particular 
“spatiotemporal relationships” to one another (Goff, 2017: p223). As Goff describes it, “facts 
about space are grounded in facts about concrete entities and the relationship between them” 
(Goff, 2017: p223). The substantivalists are then faced with the question: “Are facts about 
larger regions of space grounded in facts about smaller regions of space, or vice versa?” (Goff, 
2017: p223). According to Goff the substantivalists could argue that “(i) certain very small 
regions of space are the fundamental building blocks of reality, and that (ii) space as a whole 
is built up from such “spatial atoms”” (Goff, 2017: p223). Goff points out however that another 
option for these theorists could be to argue that (i) the whole of space is a fundamental unity, 
and that (ii) specific regions of space are aspects of this fundamental unity. If one is able to 
make sense of this latter view (“holistic substantivalism”), then one should be able to make 
sense of the notion that regions of space are grounded by subsumption in the whole of space 
(Goff,2017: 224).   
                                            
32  Goff uses the term “entity” in a broad sense to refer to any world like thing such as individuals or properties, 
events or states of affairs etc.   
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One can then contrast this with Super-substantivalism which states that “(i) space (or 
spacetime, or regions of space/spacetime) is an entity in its own right, and that (ii) material 
objects are identical to regions of space/spacetime” (Goff, 2017: p224). Regions of space 
which one considers to be filled might differ from the regions one considers to be empty, and 
the reason for this according to Goff is because they appear to possess distinct properties. In 
either scenario the owner of these properties is “the region of space itself” and not some 
separate object held within this space (Goff, 2017). Simply put, properties are attached to space 
itself (Schaffer, 2009b).  
Now if one were to combine holistic substantivalism and super-substantivalism, the result 
would be a form of priority monism. As previously mentioned, this theory states that there is 
only one fundamental entity. Similarly, the holistic super-substantivalist argues that “material 
objects are identical with regions of space, and regions of space are aspects of space as a 
whole” (Goff, 2017: p224). In summary, all that exists is obtained from the one fundamental 
whole which is space itself. A plausible question to ask at this point would be: what sorts of 
properties would such a fundamental whole have? One possible response would be in the form 
of “distributional properties” (Goff, 2017: p224). Distributional properties are properties 
characterized by how an object is “spatially filled in”, for example are they spotted or striped? 
(Goff, 2017: p224). While one generally thinks of these sorts of properties as being non-
fundamental as they are grounded in the properties of the whole, this need not be the case. The 
example Goff provides asks one to think about a red polka-dotted carpet. One generally thinks 
that the carpet is polka-dotted because of the red, round patches of material amidst the rest of 
the coloured material comprising the carpet. This ontological priority could however be 
applied the other way, as the carpet could have the fundamental property of being polka-dotted, 
and then have the red round patches in virtue of this property.  
 
If we apply this analogy to space, then one could imagine a universe with a neat polka-dotted 
dispersion of mass throughout space (Goff, 2017). One might automatically presume that such 
a polka-dotted universe has this sort of distribution due to the mass-instantiated areas of space 
spread out in this particular manner. However, Goff argues that instead it could be that the 
ontological priority could go the other way, as “space is a fundamental unity with a 
fundamental distributional property of having a polka-dotted distribution of mass, and the mass 
instantiated regions, together with their mass, are aspects of this fundamental unity” (Goff, 
2017: p225). If one is able to grasp this view, then one should be able to comprehend how the 
whole of space along with its own distributional properties ground by subsumption regions of 
space and their distributional properties. Goff suggests here that what unites these examples is 
the concept of an aspect. The idea is that an aspect could be structured as opposed to being a 
‘homogenous blob’ and that all that would be required for this to be possible is for there to be 
various components which could be examined separately from the whole, but which remain 
dependent on the whole for their existence. There are possible scenarios where aspects could 
be considered “unsaturated”, (whereby one is unable to identify the essence of said aspect 
without referring to the whole of which it is a part), however this need not be the only scenario. 
33 To see how this could be possible, consider the following example.  
                                            
33  The term “unsaturated” is accredited to Frege (1951).   
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The thesis that our space – call it “S”- is fundamental is compatible with there being a 
possible world in which S is subsumed in a more expansive space with a greater 
number of dimensions (Goff, 2017: p226).  
The notion that “S” could be subsumed in a larger entity suggests that in its own right, it is 
possible that it could be a complete unity. This element of Goff’s theory will become more 
relevant as we move along, but for now let us examine the final notes which accompany these 
assumptions.    
In Goff’s view, one can conclude two things from what we have just examined about grounding 
by subsumption. The first is that scenarios including this type of grounding relation imply an 
‘ontological free lunch’, as the nature of an aspect is ‘nothing over and above’ the whole of 
which it forms a part. As Goff simply puts it: “if region R is an aspect of the whole of space S, 
then R is nothing over and above S” (Goff, 2017: p226). Thus grounding by subsumption 
appeases the requirement that: one needs to make sense of an ontological free lunch without 
identity as an aid. This is what Goff calls the “Free Lunch Constraint.” 34 The second point 
which Goff argues plays a vital role in what follows, suggests that by acquiring an ontological 
free lunch, one is no longer required to provide an “analysis of grounded entities in more 
fundamental terms” (Goff, 2017: p227). If one refers to our previous example one can see why 
this is the case. An R region of space cannot be analysed in more fundamental terms, as R is 
considered to be an aspect of S (space as a whole). What this suggests is that “R is nothing 
over and above S”, and that aspects can be “irreducibly subsumed in a more expansive whole” 
(Goff, 2017: p227). It is this concept of an aspect as outlined above, which obtains the 
ontological free lunch thus making the grounding relation of analysis obsolete. Now that we 
have all the relevant background information, we can move onto examining whether this type 
of grounding relation can aid us in the quest of trying to ground conscious subjects.  
What we know so far about grounding by analysis, is that it asks us to ground entities into 
more fundamental facts. However when it comes to the grounding of subjects this cannot be 
done as subjects appear to be irreducible. Grounding by subsumption however does not require 
this sort of analysis as it provides us with an alternative way of grounding conscious subjects 
that is consistent with the fact that they are irreducible. What we now need to examine is the 
following:  
Subject-Subsumption- Each state of affairs of a particular o-conscious subject bearing 
certain experiential properties is grounded by subsumption in some more expansive 
unity (Goff, 2017:  p227).  
Naturally what follows from this is the question: what is the nature of such an expansive entity, 
is it another experience or could we perhaps wrap our heads around the idea that an 
experiencing subject could be an aspect of another experiencing subject? Goff provides us with 
the following ‘toy example’ where states of affairs are represented by the sentences in brackets.  
Subject-Subsumption Scenario- {subject BIG feeling, pain, anxiety, and experiencing 
red} grounds by subsumption {subject LITTLE 1 feeling pain}, {LITTLE 2 feeling 
anxious}, and {subject LITTLE 3 experiencing red} (Goff, 2017: p228).  
                                            
34 For more on the Free Lunch Constraint refer to Goff (2017: p42).   
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In this scenario the state of affairs of the BIG subject having all these various experiences is 
considered a fundamental unity and the LITTLE subjects along with their own experiences are 
considered aspects of this unity. Each LITTLE subject exists and has the experience it does on 
account of the fact that subject BIG exists and that it has its own experiences. Goff mentions 
here that he takes the BIG subject to be a “pure” subject in the Cartesian sense, indicating that 
the nature of this subject is exhausted by consciousness (Goff, 2017:228). He argues here that 
Coleman’s combination problem incorrectly assumes that because subject X constitutively 
grounds subject Y, X must now be phenomenally present in Y’s experience. Yet in the scenario 
of Subject-Subsumption it becomes evident that this type of assumption cannot be made, as 
LITTLE 1 is grounded in BIG on account of being an aspect of the BIG subject. This does not 
automatically imply that “BIG is phenomenally present within LITTLE 1 ” (Goff, 2017: p228).   
Goff mentions that it is possible to form the following type of argument against the 
intelligibility of the Subject-Subsumption scenario:  
LITTLE 1 ’s point of view is a matter of its having pain-to-the-exclusionof-all-else; this 
point of view is not an aspect of BIG’s point of view, as the latter experiences pain co-
consciously with anxiety and redness (Goff, 2017: p228).  
However, he argues that this argument appears to be weak and provides the following 
analogous argument to clearly portray this point:    
Y has 2 grams of mass and no more; hence, Y cannot be a constituent of X, as X has 
more than 2 grams of mass (Goff, 2017: p229).  
Evidently this appears to be a weak argument, so why should this differ when applied to the 
scenario of Subject-Subsumption? What it’s like to be LITTLE 1 is expressed by the fact that 
it experiences pain and nothing else. Why can this experience (limited as it may be) then not 
be an aspect of a more expansive unity? (Goff, 2017). As complex as it is for one to 
comprehend such a notion, there appears to be nothing that suggests that this argument is 
incoherent. In Goff’s view, a more concerning obstacle to the coherence of the Subject-
Subsumption case comes in the form of a conceivability argument which briefly states that if 
a concept is conceivable then it should be possible. Such an argument can be viewed as 
follows:  
The anti-subject-subsumption conceivability argument  
Premise1- “{BIG feeling pain, anxiety, and experiencing red} obtains in the absence 
of {LITTLE 1 feeling pain}” is conceivably true.  
Premise2- If BIG and X are conceived of as pure subjects, “{BIG feeling pain, anxiety, 
and experiencing red} obtains in the absence of {LITTLE 1 feeling pain}” is a 
transparent sentence.  
Premise3- Transparency Conceivability Principle (TCP)-If a transparent sentence is 
conceivably true, then it’s possibly true.   
Conclusion 1- Therefore, “{BIG feeling pain, anxiety, and experiencing red} obtains in 
the absence of {LITTLE 1 feeling pain}” is possibly true.  
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Premise4- Necessitation: If fact/entity X grounds Y, then necessarily if X 
exists/obtains, then Y exists/obtains.   
Conclusion 2-Therefore, it’s not the case that {BIG feeling pain, anxiety and 
experiencing red} grounds {LITTLE 1 feeling pain} 35 (Goff, 2017: p229).  
In order to avoid this type of problem, Goff states that one needs to provide “some nature 
beyond consciousness into the grounding base.” (Goff, 2017: p230). If one adds more nature 
to the fundamental fact, then one would be including more intrinsic nature to this entity over 
and above what it already has, thus making it an impure subject (Goff, 2017). One could 
thereby hold that consciousness is merely one aspect of a larger property, a property Goff refers 
to as “consciousness+”, which incorporates experiential and nonexperiential elements into one 
unified property (Goff, 2017: p230). Then, if one presumes that the BIG subject within the 
Subject-Grounding case is an impure subject, and that it is instantiating consciousness+ as 
opposed to consciousness, one would thereby not be perceiving the entire nature of this subject 
when one conceives of it only as something conscious. As a result, the sentence “{BIG feeling 
pain, anxiety, and experiencing red} obtaining in the absence of {LITTLE 1 feeling pain]” is 
then not a transparent sentence, preventing the move from conceivability to possibility (Goff, 
2017: p230). As a result, one is lead to the following:  
Consciousness+ Subject-Subsumption- {subject X bearing such and such 
consciousness+ properties} grounds by subsumption {Subject Y bearing such and such 
experiential properties} (Goff, 2017: p230).  
Goff states here that the above notion involves a substantial “degree of noumenalism about 
fundamental reality.” (Goff, 2017: p230). He argues that what attracts us to “a pure form of 
panpsychism” is the fact that we generally know that fundamental reality is transparent (Goff, 
2017: p230). However, because we lack a general understanding of the non-experiential 
elements of consciousness+, we appear to lack “the general understanding of the deep nature 
of matter” (Goff, 2017: p230).As such, Goff argues that the only way to logically make sense 
of the grounding of conscious subjects by subsumption, is to utilize consciousness+ along with 
subject-subsumption. He notes that the component of noumenalism is not epistemically 
optimal as one would ideally prefer a full picture of reality. However he asks us to remember 
a crucial point, which is that physical science only reveals the causal structures of reality and 
hence should not provide us with unwarranted optimism about what it is that we can achieve 
when it comes to unravelling the deeper aspects of nature. Regardless of the fact that this theory 
incorporates noumenalism, Goff argues that it provides one with an advantage that other 
theories do not have. The fact that grounding by subsumption does not require one to reduce 
subjects into more fundamental facts, provides one with an opportunity to ground subjects in 
a manner that is in alignment with it being irreducible. As difficult as it is to get one’s head 
around this idea, Goff argues that the task is not impossible. To see how this could be done, 
let us reflect on the following.   
In sections 3.1 and 3.2, we examined potential theories which adopted the notion of smallism 
which stated that: everything that exists, is grounded in micro-level facts. This particular notion 
                                            
35  For a similar type of conceivability argument refer to Chalmers (2015).   
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accommodates a grounding by analysis understanding of constitutive grounding, as micro-
level facts necessitate the existence of macro-level entities.   
However, from what we have already seen this type of grounding relation appears to come up 
short when trying to ground conscious subjects. As a result of this failure, philosophers have 
gone in search for alternative theories that are better equipped to tackle this kind of challenge. 
One such promising theory comes in the form of priority monism which states that there is 
only one fundamental entity and that this is the cosmos. 36 According to this theory, everything 
within the cosmos exists and is the way that it is because the cosmos exists and is the way that 
it is. Priority monism accommodates a grounding by subsumption understanding of 
constitutive grounding, as the cosmos is considered to be a “fundamental unified whole” where 
all other entities are considered to be aspects of this whole (Goff, 2017: p234). By accepting 
priority monism, one is able to find a straightforward and neat way of grounding conscious 
subjects by subsumption.   
As Goff explains:   
“We can suppose that the universe is a fundamental unified subject, a bearer of 
consciousness+, and that states of affairs involving osubjects having such and such 
states of consciousness+ are aspects of states of affairs of the universe having such and 
such states of consciousness+, which results in the theory we know as 
“cosmopsychism.” (Goff, 2017: p234).   
While it is possible to view this theory as a form of idealism, or as a form of constitutive 
Russellian monism, or even as a form of physicalism, Goff suggests that instead, we should 
view this theory as Constitutive Cosmopsychism. According to this theory, the cosmos is a 
physical entity and the “o-subjects it subsumes” are physical as well (Goff, 2017: p235). Goff 
argues here that although physical science is capable of explaining the causal structures of the 
universe, it is unable to explain its deeper nature due to the fact that it is comprised of 
consciousness+. The causal structure of the brain is outlined by neuroscience, but its deeper 
nature is “a bearer of consciousness+”, and this bearer is considered “an irreducible aspect of 
the consciousness+ bearing universe” (Goff, 2017: p235).  
A possible objection to this comes in the form of an argument put forth by Adam Pautz, which 
states that constitutive cosmopsychism is an unpleasantly complex theory. The cause of the 
complexity lies in the fact that the cosmopsychist is forced to assume a large number of “big-
to-small grounding laws” (Goff, 2017: p235). If one were to examine the relationship between 
the fixed state of consciousness+ represented by the universe at this moment (one can refer to 
it as “consciousness+ B I G 1 ”) and the fixed state of consciousness+ represented by one’s own 
brain at this very moment (one can refer to it as “consciousness+ L I T T L E 1 ”), then it appears 
as though one would be required to explain the grounding relation of these two properties. In 
an attempt to do this, one would need to explain the above relation in terms of the “brute big-
to-small grounding law” which states that: should there be something which represents 
consciousness+ B I G 1 , then that would ground the existence of something representing 
consciousness+ L I T T L E 1 (Goff, 2017: p235). Goff argues here that entertaining such a notion 
would lead one into trouble, as this would require an extremely large amount of grounding 
                                            
36  See Schaffer (2007, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012, 2013) for more on priority monism.   
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laws. The reason being is that at any given moment a different fixed state of consciousness 
represented by the universe could occur (one could call it consciousness+ B I G 2 ), and a different 
fixed state of consciousness represented by oneself (one could call it consciousness+ L I T T L E 
2 ) could occur. This would then require a different grounding relation which would explain 
how something possessing consciousness+ B I G 2 grounds something which possesses 
consciousness+ L I T T L E 2 etc. As Goff explains: “for every possible determinate state of the 
cosmos X and every corresponding determinate state of me Y, it must be a basic law that if 
something has X, then it grounds the existence of something having Y” (Goff, 2017: p236).   
What we can take from this is that one would then be required to account for all the possible 
states of any given subject and/or any given physical entity, as well as all the possible states 
of oneself resulting in an absurd amount of grounding laws forming the “extreme theoretical 
vice” which Pautz identifies. 37 (Goff, 2017: p236). Goff states here that perhaps Pautz views 
the fundamental properties of the universe as blobby, (devoid of any structure) which is why 
he argues that these grounding laws are required. However he denies that this is the case in the 
constitutive cosmopsychist world he’s outlined, as he takes the fundamental properties to have 
rich structure (Goff, 2017: p236). Regardless of the fact that each property is considered 
fundamentally unified, this unity subsumes a large amount of other aspects in the same way 
that the cosmos being a fundamental unity subsumes a vast amount of parts as dependent 
aspects (Goff, 2017). He argues at this point that the state of affairs representing 
consciousness+ B I G 1 is a unity that incorporates the state of affairs representing 
consciousness+ L I T T L E 1 as an aspect, and that as a result of this there is no longer the 
requirement for the grounding. A simple way to understand this is to refer to an earlier 
example. Recall that one’s current experience of red is an aspect of one’s overall conscious 
experience. From this it is clear that there is no need to include a grounding law as the red 
experience is already included in the overall experience as an aspect 38 At this point Goff 
decides to elaborate on his theory by providing us with more details, specifically with regards 
to whether or not there are other conscious subjects apart from the cosmos and o-subjects.   
With what we have examined thus far, we know that Goff implicitly denies the notion that o-
subjects are grounded by analysis. Yet what isn’t clear is whether or not other features of reality 
are grounded by analysis. In the case of micro-level particles, if one considers them to be 
conscious then that would suggest that they be grounded by subsumption in facts about the 
universe. However, if one considers these particles non-conscious then there is a possibility 
that it could be grounded by analysis in facts about the universe. If we consider electrons for 
example, (which are characterized by their ‘nomic role’ in physics) it seems possible that the 
nomic role could correspond to a specific pattern within the distributional properties of the 
cosmos, in such a way that all that would be required for an electron to exist is for that specific 
                                            
37  See Pautz (unpublished manuscript) for more on these grounding laws.   
38  Goff (2017: p 237) makes a note here to say that the way he pictures constitutive cosmopsychism is  no more 
parsimonious than emergentism as the relationship between them can be equated to the relationship between states 
of affairs and substrata and properties being fundamental. On Armstrong’s view, substrata and properties are not 
fundamental because states of affairs are fundamental.  However states of affairs contain substrata and properties 
as irreducible components, which suggests that the notion that fundamentally there are “substrata-having 
properties” is no more parsimonious than the notion that fundamentally there are substrata and properties 




pattern to be represented (Goff, 2017). Whether or not this can be applied to all entities (apart 
from the cosmos and o-subjects) depends on whether or not we believe that they are conscious. 
Goff argues that “parsimony and common sense” persuade us not to equate consciousness to 
inanimate entities, but that perhaps for reasons pertaining to elegance, one might consider 
otherwise (Goff, 2017: p238). Should one assume that matters regarding consciousness are not 
vague, then in Goff’s view the notion that (aside from the cosmos) only o-subjects are 
conscious will eventually lead us to exact ‘cut-off points’ for the conditions required for a 
‘non-cosmic subject’ to exist. According to this, we would have to presume for example that 
some exact change involving micro-level modification, ensures that there would be a 
conversion from ‘non-conscious to conscious fetus’. What makes this seem unlikely is the fact 
that this difference was produced by this exact change according to Goff.   
Due to this, Goff suggests that in figuring out the specific details of his theory, one would need 
to make room for conscious subjects within the commitments apart from o-subjects and the 
cosmos. If for instance one accepted the idea that the micro-level involved consciousness, then 
surely this would contradict the assumption of phenomenal transparency. The reason being, 
according to Goff, is that if one’s pain is merely c-fibre firing, then c-fibre firing should 
basically involve a large amount of ‘micro-level conscious properties.’ And if one has a total 
understanding of the nature of one’s pain, then it should be evident that one’s pain basically 
involves a large amount of ‘micro-level properties?’ (Goff, 2017: p239). However this doesn’t 
appear to be the case in terms of experience. This is known as the revelation argument 
traditionally posed against panpsychism, but which can also be posed against constitutive 
cosmopsychism. 39  In a response to this, Goff suggests that what is needed is a differentiation 
between the various types of aspects. The way in which he pictures his cosmopsychist world 
suggests that “for any object o with irreducible entities as proper parts x 1 , x 2 , x n ..., x 1 , x 2 , 
x n are aspects of o.” (Goff, 2017: p239).  These aspects which are considered proper parts of 
the whole can be referred to as “vertical aspects”, yet these aspects may have aspects of their 
own which take away from their inherent richness, which can be referred to as “horizontal 
aspects.” (Goff, 2017: p 239).  
In order to fully understand this, let us consider the following. One could think of a brain as 
being a vertical aspect of the cosmos in such a way that if one were to take away from some 
of the richness of said brain and perceive it purely in computational terms, then one would be 
perceiving the horizontal aspect of said vertical aspect (which is the brain) (Goff, 2017: p239). 
Simply put, the cosmos and its various parts are “particulars” however it is possible that there 
could be a similar distinction between aspects which are considered properties.   
With regards to the Subject-Subsumption scenarios we’ve examined, we initially pictured 
subjects/experiences as being vertical aspects of other subjects/experiences. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to assume that subjects/experiences could be horizontal aspects of other subjects or 
experiences, in such a way that the former subjects/experiences are relatively rich, whilst the 
latter takes away from this richness (Goff, 2017: p240). Goff argues here that this concept 
appears difficult to comprehend, yet there appears to be no reason to think that it is 
unintelligible. Similarly as he describes, it appears difficult for one to comprehend the idea of 
a 4dimensional object, yet there appears to be no argument against the coherence of the idea 
                                            
39  Refer to Goff (2006) and Cutter (2016) for more on the revelation argument.   
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that there could be 4 - dimensional objects. If this is all coherent, then the constitutive 
cosmopsychist would need to view o-subjects as being horizontal aspects of brains, as brain 
states would be classed as the vertical aspects of the cosmos. 40 This solves the worry brought 
about by the revelation argument, as we have an explanation for why one’s experiential states 
don’t appear as having a large amount of micro-experiential properties. 41 The basic conscious 
states of one’s brain does have experiential states which include a large amount of micro-
experiential properties, but one’s o-conscious states appear to be horizontal aspects of these 
initial basic conscious states, which implies that they take away from some of the richness of 
these basic states of one’s brain.  
As a result, the connection between one’s consciousness and one’s brain’s consciousness is 
similar to the connection between “software and hardware.” (Goff, 2017: p241). In the same 
way that one could know what the computational properties of a given system are without 
knowing what the physical properties are, (as the computational properties take away from the 
precise nature of the physical properties) one could gain “revelatory access” to the nature of 
one’s consciousness without gaining access to the nature of one’s brain’s consciousness. 42    
There is of course another concern when it comes to the version of constitutive cosmopsychism 
which Goff has presented. This worry concerns the notion of sharing thoughts with the cosmos. 
If one’s pain is considered a horizontal aspect of a vertical aspect of the cosmos, then it would 
appear as if one’s pain is an aspect of the cosmos, which further implies that the cosmos would 
feel one’s pain (Goff, 2017). 43 If this is true then that would suggest that every possible 
experience of every possible entity would be felt by the cosmos. According to Miri Albahari 
this presents with a serious problem for the constitutive cosmopsychist. She provides the 
following example to elaborate on this:  
Consider Fiona’s intense and pervasive fear that she will be annihilated upon death, a 
fear whose first-personal character is partly owed to its mind-dominating nature. Goff’s 
cosmic subject must directly experience not only Fiona’s intense fear of dying but also 
Fred’s overwhelming excitement at his impending reincarnation. Yet qualifying just a 
fraction of the cosmic mind, it’s hard to envisage how each emotion could, from the 
personal cosmic perspective, retain their defining first-personal characters as intense 
and dominating, and hence as those particular emotions. It is also difficult to conceive 
of how the cosmic subject could first-personally harbour what would, to its singular 
conscious perspective, be the mass of everyone’s contradicting beliefs and identities, 
e.g. “there is only one life”, “there is more than one life”, “I am Fiona”, “I am Fred”. 
These epistemic considerations make Goff’s subject-grounding scenario not only 
unimaginable, but I suggest, incoherent. 44  
                                            
40  Goff (2017: p240) poses a question at this point asking whether or not the horizontal aspects of brain states 
do any causal work? Goff states that there appears to be no reason to deny this, as there is no overdetermination 
that occurs. The reason being is that one’s conscious states are nothing over and above one’s brain states, and in 
the case of cosmopsychism, one’s brain states are nothing over and above the states of the cosmos.    
41 For more on how this response solves the structural mismatch problem, see Goff (2017: 241).   
42 Goff notes that his use of the notion of horizontal aspects is similar to the notion of a compositional property 
by Pereboom (2011: ch.8), and that the terminology which he uses is attributed to Hedda Hassel Morch.  
43  See Goff (2017: p231) for more on why this is a particular problem for the constitutive cosmopsychist.   
44 Albahari (2019).   
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Goff’s response to this is to note firstly, that Albahari’s argument is based on the assumption 
of phenomenal intentionality which states that “intentionality is grounded in consciousness.” 
45 (Goff, 2017: p242). This particular worry could then be avoided by simply denying this 
assumption, however Goff chooses not to take this route as he appears to support this notion. 
Instead Goff argues when focussing on the concept of ‘mind dominating nature’ one could 
interpret the meaning in two different ways. The first way to interpret this is to regard it as 
something which is “irreducibly phenomenological” (which means it possesses its own unique 
character) (Goff, 2017: p242). What this entails is that thoughts are grounded within the 
cosmos therein suggesting that they are primitives and therefore cannot be further reduced.    
The second manner is to acknowledge the fact that Fiona has fear and nothing else apart from 
fear within her conscious mind according to Goff. In terms of the second understanding, he 
argues that the ‘mind-dominating nature’ is not regarded as a conscious state which must be 
shared with the universe. Instead this state of fear is brought about by the fact that there is no 
other equally overpowering conscious state within Fiona’s mind. Additionally, Goff suggests 
that the fact that this is the only overpowering experience Fiona is feeling, does not exclude 
her from being ‘subsumed in a more expansive conscious mind’ (along with more 
overpowering experiences), just as one having an index finger weighing 2 grams does not 
exclude it from being a part of a larger body weighing 50kilograms. With regards to the cosmos 
having states of “conscious cognition” with content which appears to be contradictory, Goff 
argues that this is not a serious problem as Cosmopsychism does not adopt the notion of 
Pantheism (Goff, 2017: p243). He argues that there is no need for us to think of the cosmos as 
a ‘supremely intelligent rational agent’, as those characteristics are usually only assigned to 
‘highly evolved conscious creatures’. In addition, he argues that one need not view the universe 
as being divinely intelligent and rational as these are characteristics associated with “highly 
evolved beings”, and as such do not apply to the universe (Goff, 2017: p243). Instead Goff 
notes that it is more likely that the consciousness of the universe is a mess, and that regardless 
of the fact that it appears difficult for us to picture such a singular mental entity possessing all 
these contents which are chaotic and conflicting, there appears to be no argument suggesting 
that it is impossible.    
  
(5.5) SHANI AND GOFF VS THE DE-COMBINATION PROBLEM  
Now that we are fully equipped with all the relevant background information, it is time to head 
to battle. In this section we have Shani versus Goff in the battle against the de-combination 
problem. By comparing these two theories, the hope is that we will be able to determine which 
rendition of Cosmopsychism is the better opponent in terms of solving the de-combination 
problem, in addition to figuring out which theory is better equipped to answer the ontological 
questions we have regarding consciousness. It should be noted that our opponents do not 
directly respond to Miller’s argument within their respective theories. However, what we shall 
investigate is how they might potentially respond to this problem by utilizing the information 
we have gathered within the previous pages.  
                                            
45 Kriegel (2013) offers a collection of essays on this topic.   
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We begin this section by examining a brief overview of both theories before moving onto a 
more distilled view of how our opponents attend to the de-combination problem provided to 
us by Miller (as discussed in section 5.2).    
To begin, let us recap some of the details pertaining to the de-combination problem before 
attending to our competitors and their views. If we recall the arguments put forth by Miller 
(2018) within the de-combination problem, the combination problem and the de-combination 
problem both examine the nature of experiencing subjects in terms of their features, 
specifically focussing on “unity” and “boundedness”. The definitions which Miller provided 
us with to clarify the specific conditions needed for unity and boundedness to occur 
simultaneously are:   
Phenomenal Unity: a set of experiences E 1 … E n is phenomenally unified at time T 1 
iff they have a conjoint phenomenology at T 1 , i.e. there is something which it is like 
to have them ‘together’ at T 1 .   
Phenomenal Boundedness: a set of experiences E 1 … E n is phenomenally bound at 
time T 1 iff (i) they are phenomenally unified and (ii) not phenomenally unified with 
any other experience E x beyond that set at T 1  (Miller, 2018: p6).   
When we combine the above definitions we are left with what Miller terms the 
‘Unity/Boundedness Inconsistency Thesis’ which he defines as follows:  
Unity/Boundedness Inconsistency Thesis (UBIT): (i) phenomenal unity cannot 
extend beyond a bound phenomenal field, and (ii) phenomenal boundedness cannot 
occur within a unified phenomenal field 47 (Miller, 2018: p7).  
What the above addresses, is the concern of ‘absolute breaches’ as raised by William James. 
Breaches such as these arise from unity and boundedness which evidently create minds that 
are private or windowless, and which must hold true if the concept of a personal mind is to 
have any meaning (Miller, 2018: p7). Simply put, the above structural features are required if 
one is to obtain ‘subjecthood’ (Miller, 2018: p7). Miller expresses this concept in the following 
manner:   
Subject Essence Thesis (SET): Subjects are essentially phenomenally unified and 
bound.  
According to Miller, this suggests that the problem consists of trying to bridge the gap between 
the absolute breaches in nature, (between phenomenal unity and boundedness). If we keep the 
above in mind, then one could view the de-combination problem as being the problem of 
having to explain how a subject with an “essentially bound consciousness” could come from 
a “cosmos-subject with an essentially unified consciousness?” (Miller, 2018: p8).   
From this we can ascertain that according to James’ view, the only breaches which could 
possibly take place within a subject’s conscious sphere are: (i) temporal or (ii) qualitative. The 
absolute breaches which result from phenomenal boundedness, cannot take place in a single 
subject’s consciousness (Miller, 2018: p8). Miller argues here that what this implies is that 
James supports the Phenomenal Unity/Boundedness Inconsistency Thesis (UBIT) along with 
the Subject Essence Thesis (SET). In utilizing both, Miller leads us to the de-combination 
argument against Cosmopsychism which is as follows:  
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1) Cosmopsychism: The cosmos is a single subject-whole and all macro-subjects are 
subject-proper parts of the single cosmos-subject.  
2) Unity/Boundedness Inconsistency Thesis (UBIT): (i) phenomenal unity cannot 
extend beyond a bound phenomenal field, and (ii) phenomenal boundedness cannot 
occur within a unified phenomenal field.   
3) Subject Essence Thesis (SET): Subjects are essentially phenomenally unified and 
bound.   
4) The cosmos is essentially phenomenally unified and bound, and each of its macro-
subject-proper parts is essentially unified and bound (from 1 and 3).  
5) If the cosmos has phenomenal boundaries ‘within’ its phenomenally unified field, 
then it is not a subject, and, if phenomenal unity extends beyond the boundary of 
the subject-proper parts, then they are not subjects (from 2 and 3).   
6) Hence, the cosmos is not a subject and its proper parts are not subjects (from 4 and 
5)  
7) Hence, cosmopsychism is false (from 1 and 6) (Miller, 2018: p9).  
What becomes evident at this point is that cosmopsychists are faced with the problem of 
explaining the subject-subject proper parthood relation which requires them to account for the 
key components of unity and boundedness of conscious subjects.   
  
(5.6) OUR FIRST OPPONENT: ITAY SHANI’S RESPONSE TO DE-COMBO.   
We begin with our first opponent (Shani), and his response against the decombination 
argument set out above. The battle which lies ahead of our opponent is the task of having to 
explain how macro-level subjects endowed with their own perspectives (which are comprised 
of the key elements of unity and boundedness) are connected to a cosmos-subject which has 
its own perspective (which is also comprised of unity and boundedness). Shani begins by 
rejecting the second premise of Millers argument which is the Unity/Boundedness 
Inconsistency Thesis (UBIT). He then formulates his theory in such a way that its structure is 
relative to specific subjects whilst distinguishing between the concepts of an absolute and a 
relative’s unity and boundedness. This can be seen in his main argument which appears as 
follows: AP is a partial ground for RP. From what we already know, AP is meant to refer to 
the absolute’s perspective and RP is meant to refer to the relative’s perspective, both of which 
are comprised of the key components of unity and boundedness. Due to the fact that the RP’s 
nature is not fully explained in terms of this dependency relation, suggests that only half of RP 
is grounded in AP, and that the other half of its nature is what affirms its independence.  
With what we’ve previously examined, we know that each perspective of every possible 
relative subject has a dual nature which is comprised of a specific character and a generic 
character. The specific character in Shani’s view is meant to be thought of as a unique 
individual profile which does not come from another perspective nor a combination of 
perspectives, and the generic character is meant to be thought of as a basic template which 
comes from the subjective perspective nature of the absolute (Shani, 2015: p423).  
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In terms of the dual nature of any given perspective, Shani states that one half (which is 
represented as the specific character) is regarded as an independent entity, which implies that 
it neither grounds other perspectives, nor is it grounded by any other perspective, and that the 
other half of the same perspective (which is represented as the generic character), is grounded 
in the fact that the absolute is a subject which possesses its own first-person perspective.   
It is due to this very notion (that perspectives are comprised of a specific character) that Shani 
argues that no perspective can be a part of another perspective, and that AP plays a crucial role 
in the explanation of RP. In section 5.3 we saw that the specific character of a perspective is 
what provides it with its differentiated form, which is what separates it from other perspectives. 
According to Shani, every subjective perspective is composed of a unique outlook which is 
what gives it its individual way of relating to things from a specific standpoint. This particular 
fact (that each perspective is different as a result of its specific characteristic) is what he relies 
on in his argument to show that perspectives cannot combine. If we recall the illustration Shani 
provided us with in the form of Figure 1, then we would remember that he utilizes this diagram 
to make his point clearer.   
To summarize: he argues at this point that perspective P could be thought of as a 90˚ angle 
whose point of origin is its vertex and whose form is limited by the rays which emanate from 
that vertex. If this perspective P is to have any proper parts, then it would have to correlate 
with a division of the original angle which is what we see represented by the ray in the middle 
of this angle. What Shani attempts to show us with this illustration, is that perspective P (which 
is the original 90˚ angle) is free from any limitations with regards to its unique outlook as it 
does not have any components. However, once we include the concept of components (which 
is represented by the middle ray Q in Figure 1), then we simultaneously include a limitation 
as Q is comprised of its own unique outlook which now needs to be factored into the original 
angle. Due to this inclusion, we appear to be faced with an exclusion of a perspective 
represented by P-Q in the diagram, which leaves us with a contradiction as we now have an 
inclusion of a perspective Q as well as an exclusion of a perspective P-Q (Shani, 2015: p425).  
What this aims to show is that subjective perspectives (outlooks) are what Shani refers to as 
gestalts which are structural compounds that cannot be explained in further detail by referring 
to the combination of their components. The reason for this is then that when it comes to 
working with perspectives the existence of parts excludes the existence of the whole (Shani, 
2015: p425). With what we’ve already examined, this becomes apparent as the inclusion of 
components introduces a limitation which wasn’t there before, further resulting in an exclusion 
of the original perspective. If the above holds true, then what is implied is that perspectives by 
nature prevent the existence of compositional relations between perspectives (Shani, 2015: 
p425). This however does not suggest that all relatives are dependent on the perspectival nature 
of the absolute for their existence. As Shani argues, this is where the notion of generic 
character could offer a solution.   
The definition previously provided for this concept stated that a generic character was a set of 
common features assigned to all perspectives, without which there would be no perspectives. 
What this implies is that all relatives receive their generic character (of their individual 
perspectives) from the absolute, as the absolute possesses its own perspective and is regarded 
as the place of origin of these individual selves (Shani, 2015: p425). The two basic features of 
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sentience and core-subjectivity is what Shani provides us with in an attempt to explain how 
one could obtain such generic characteristics from the subjective nature of the absolute. He 
argues that the reason sentience is regarded as a generic characteristic is due to the fact that 
each perspective has its own way of experiencing things which suggests that it must have this 
particular feature. Additionally he notes that without the absolute’s innate ability to experience 
things, there would be no individual experiences for the relatives to have and therefore there 
would be no individual perspectives. In terms of the second basic feature of coresubjectivity, 
Shani argues that this could be regarded as the point of origin that a perspective has which is 
what provides it with its unique outlook. This point of origin also referred to as ipseity/I-ness 
is considered as the sense of self which the relative has or in other words represents the ‘who’ 
that receives certain experiences (Shani, 2015: p426).  
Why this becomes relevant, is that when we combine this with  
Cosmopsychism, the sense of self/ I-ness which lies at the core of a relative, is actually the 
absolute’s own core-selfhood. If we recall in the beginning of section 5.3, Shani stated that the 
absolute’s cosmic consciousness is a medium of subjective receptivity. As such, when a 
relative is created within the absolute then this receptivity is transmitted to the relative (in the 
form of a generic characteristic) and is finished off with a subjective realm of its own (which 
is what allows it to experience things as an individual entity). However each relative has a 
mind of its own (which is the specific characteristic that it possesses) which is a 
spatiotemporally enclosed web of organized activity along with an I-ness that gives it its unique 
outlook. As a result of this, the I-ness becomes so overwhelmed and captivated by what its 
experiencing that it unknowingly creates a veil between itself and its connection to the cosmic 
consciousness. To put this simply, the subjective receptivity which lies at the base of the 
relative is forced to function as a restricted I-ness which acts as the ‘who’ that receives all that 
it experiences. Shani states that what this implies is that all relatives are imbued with an 
individual sense of selfhood regardless of the fact that all these core-selves are grounded in one 
gigantic universal selfhood. What this is meant to show us is that the basic features of sentience 
and core-subjectivity in conjunction with Cosmopsychism provides an argument as to how 
perspectives are able to obtain their generic character from the subjective nature of the absolute, 
whilst retaining a specific character which is neither obtained from another perspective nor a 
combination of perspectives. Simply put, the above elaborates on how Shani’s theory of: AP 
is a partial ground for RP can occur.  
From what we’ve just examined, we are able to see how our opponent is able to bypass the 
problem of de-combination. Shani differentiates between the absolute and the relative’s 
perspectives, whilst arguing that the absolute’s perspective is merely a partial ground for the 
relative’s perspective. 46  Shani’s approach to the problem at hand can be seen as a rejection 
of Miller’s second premise which is the Unity/Boundedness Inconsistency Thesis. In rejecting 
this premise, Shani is able to avoid the reducio of the de-combination problem as he’s 
differentiated between the absolute’s perspective and that of the relative’s perspective which 
manages to keep the key components of perspectives which are unity and boundedness from 
clashing.  
                                            
46 Shani’s approach differs to that of Miller’s, however the outcome remains the same. Refer to Miller (2018: 
p11) for his approach to rejecting the Unity/Boundedness Inconsistency Thesis.   
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Additionally, although Shani does not explicitly state this, it can be inferred from his theory 
that within the one half of the perspective’s nature (which falls under generic characteristics), 
the key component of unity can be found, along with sentience and core-subjectivity.   
As such, when a relative is created within the absolute, these basic features are transferred to 
the relative (in the form of a generic characteristic) along with its subjective realm. This 
provides the relative with its own unity, sentience and core-subjectivity which ultimately gives 
rise to its specific characteristics (via its own internal causal organization) which are its 
boundedness along with the I-ness required for it to be regarded as an individual entity. This 
allows Shani to maintain that the unity and boundedness of the absolute and relative do not 
clash, as the boundedness of the relative has no impact on the unity of the absolute due to it 
being regarded as a specific characteristic that is not derived from the absolute. Additionally, 
the absolute’s unity does not appear to extend beyond the boundary of the relative, as this 
aspect was transferred to the relative as a generic characteristic from the absolute itself. As a 
result, Shani manages to provide an argument whereby the absolute’s perspective is only a 
partial ground for the relative’s perspective, which allows him to retain the notion that there 
are no compositional relations between perspectives, thus bypassing the problem of de-
combination. With this in mind, we now move onto examining our second competitor’s 
response to the de-combination problem.  
  
(5.7) OUR SECOND OPPONENT: PHILIP GOFF’S RESPONSE TO DECOMBO.    
Now that we have taken a closer look at Shani’s response to the decombination problem, it is 
time to see how our second opponent faces up to the same challenge. To reiterate, the challenge 
which our opponent must face is the task of having to explain how macro-level subjects 
endowed with their own perspectives could be grounded in a cosmos-subject which is endowed 
with its own perspective.  
Goff begins by accepting the primary premises 1-3, followed by the acceptance of the 
inferences to 4 and 5. From this point onwards, Goff denies the inference to 6 (from 4 and 5) 
as this inference only goes through given a background presupposition of a grounding by 
analysis relation. By denying this relation, Goff denies the existence of phenomenal boundaries 
within the cosmos’ phenomenally unified field, as well as the notion that phenomenal unity 
extends beyond the boundary of the subject-proper parts. This then allows him to deny that 
neither the cosmos nor the subject-proper parts can be considered subjects, and thereby reject 
the conclusion that the theory of Cosmopsychism if false. To see how this is done, let us look 
at his first line of attack. Goff starts off by arguing that subjects by their very nature are 
irreducible entities, which renders the grounding relation of analysis within this argument 
obsolete. If we recall in section 5.4, Goff argues that when one accepts the assumptions of 
Phenomenal Transparency and Anti-Physicalism then one is provided with strong grounds for 
accepting the notion that subjects are irreducible. The definition which he provides for this 
appears as follows:   
General Form of a Deflationary Analysis of Subjecthood – For it to be the case that 
there is a conscious subject X is for it to be the case that there are Y’s that are F, where 
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X need not be one of the Y’s (or for it to be the case that there is a Y that is F, where 
X need not be identical with Y) (Goff, 2017: p210).  
From this it is clear that Subject Irreducibility should be understood as the thesis that there are 
no deflationary analyses of subjecthood, and that a conscious subject S cannot be analysed into 
facts not involving S (Goff, 2017: p209). When it comes to the notion of subjecthood, it 
appears that one is not able to provide a deflationary analysis which further suggests that an 
alternative means for grounding subjects may be required. As previously examined in section 
5.4, Goff provides the following argument to argue this point.  
The argument for Subject Irreducibility  
Premise 1- If the analysis of subjecthood is a priori, then it is deflationary only if 
analytic functionalism is true.  
Premise 2- Analytic Functionalism is false.  
Premise 3- The analysis of subjecthood is a priori (implied by Phenomenal 
Transparency).  
Conclusion- The analysis of subjecthood is not deflationary (i.e., Subject Irreducibility) 
(Goff, 2017: p216).  
The above is regarded as a form of constitutive grounding which can be understood as a type 
of grounding by analysis. From what we’ve previously examined and briefly re-called here, it 
appears as though this form of grounding is unsuitable for matters concerning conscious 
subjects. As such Goff’s move is to provide us with an alternative manner in which to ground 
subjects by utilizing what he terms grounding by subsumption. This is defined as:  
Entity X grounds by subsumption entity Y iff (i) X grounds Y, and (ii) X is a unity of 
which Y is an aspect (Goff, 2017: p221).  
If we recall from section 5.4, Goff states that the terms unity and aspect are meant to be 
understood as primitives, as neither term requires further analysis. He then leads us into some 
examples to elaborate on the concept of grounding by subsumption. In order to briefly refresh 
our memories, let us re-examine the example of Hue, Saturation and Lightness in colour which 
Goff provides. If one were to take a particular shade of colour for instance orange 7 (as Goff 
describes it), then one would notice that this colour involves a red and a yellow hue, along with 
a degree of saturation and a degree of lightness to it. One could then view this orange 7 colour 
as a mixed property which is comprised of red and yellow hues as well as specific degrees of 
saturation and lightness. To put this simply, one could view this colour as a unified property 
whereby the above elements are considered to be aspects. According to Goff, if one is able to 
wrap one’s head around this example, then one should be able to grasp the notion of how hue, 
saturation and lightness could be grounded by subsumption in instances of colour (Goff, 2017: 
p221).   
What this is meant to show us is that an aspect can be structured and that all that would be 
required for this to be a possibility is for there to be a number of components which could be 
examined separately from the whole, whilst remaining dependent on the whole for its 
existence.   
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This example is utilized to show us that by incorporating a grounding by subsumption relation, 
one obtains an ontological free lunch, as the nature of an aspect is nothing over and above the 
whole of which it is a component. If we apply this notion to the above example, then the yellow 
hue would be an aspect of the whole which is orange 7, and as such the yellow hue would be 
nothing over and above orange 7, suggesting there’s an ontological free lunch. In addition, by 
acquiring this ontological free lunch there is no longer the requirement of having to provide an 
analysis of grounded entities in further fundamental terms. For instance is we refer to the 
above, the yellow hue cannot be analysed into more fundamental terms as it is considered to 
be an aspect of orange 7 as a whole. This implies that the yellow hue is nothing over and above 
orange 7, and that aspects such as these can be completely subsumed in a larger entity. By 
incorporating such a grounding relation, one no longer has to ground subjects into further 
fundamental facts, as this alternative form provides one with the means to ground subjects in 
a manner that is compatible with the fact that subjects are irreducible. In order to see how a 
subject could be subsumed within another subject, Goff provides the following example to 
elaborate.   
Subject-Subsumption Scenario – {subject BIG feeling pain, anxiety, and experiencing 
red} grounds by subsumption {subject LITTLE 1 feeling pain}, {LITTLE 2 feeling 
anxious}, and {subject LITTLE 3 experiencing red} (Goff, 2017: p228).  
From what we’ve already examined, Goff argues that each LITTLE subject exists and has the 
experience it has as a result of the fact that subject BIG exists and that it has all its own 
experiences. In Goff’s view, the nature of this BIG subject is exhausted by consciousness 
implying that it is a pure subject. The relevance of this becomes evident now as our opponent 
is faced with the task of tackling the de-combination problem. Goff refers to the original 
combination problem to make his point, as he argues that Coleman (2013) makes an incorrect 
assumption within this initial argument. He argues that Coleman incorrectly assumes that 
because subject X constitutively grounds subject Y, X must be phenomenally present within 
Y’s experience. However in the case of Subject-Subsumption it becomes clear that such an 
assumption cannot be made, as LITTLE 1 is grounded within the BIG subject (as it is 
considered to be an aspect of the BIG subject), and as such does not imply that the BIG subject 
is phenomenally present within LITTLE 1 .  When we apply this to the de-combination problem 
as set out by Miller, Goff appears to reject the inference that leads to the 6 t h premise as he 
denies the underlying assumption of grounding by analysis, thus rejecting the notion that 
subjects can be reduced into more fundamental facts. By making this move, Goff would then 
reject the 6 t h and 7 t h inference which appear as follows:   
6) Hence, the cosmos is not a subject and its proper parts are not subjects (from 4 and 
5)  
7) Hence, cosmopsychism is false (from 1 and 6) (Miller, 2018: p9).  
If one were to accept the assumption (of grounding by analysis), then what would follow would 
be 6 and 7 above, which we see within Miller’s argument. With what we already know, Goff 
rejects this type of grounding relation (as he argues that subjects are irreducible entities) and 
hence the background assumption. Goff’s line of attack is to incorporate a grounding by 
subsumption relation wherein the macro-subjects are considered aspects of the cosmos as a 
whole, thereby allowing both the macro-subjects and the cosmos to be phenomenally unified 
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and bound without there being any breaches. This then allows him to avoid the 6 t h and 7 t h 
inferences (from the 4 t h and 5 t h premises), as his incorporation of an alternative grounding 
relation ensures that macro-subjects can be completely grounded within the cosmos, while 
ensuring that both retain their status as subjects. As such, Goff has managed to retain the 
primary premises of Miller’s argument whilst providing an argument of his own which allows 
one to constitutively ground macro-subjects in the cosmos-subject, thus rendering the theory 
of Cosmopsychism coherent and providing a solid argument against the decombination.   
Now that we have addressed the aspect of how our opponents fair against the de-combination 
problem, we can move onto briefly examining the second commitment of the Cosmopsychist 
theory which was brought forward by Kastrup (2018) in section 5.1.  
  
(5.8) WHICH FUNDAMENTAL BASIS BEST SUITS COSMOPSYCHISM?  
With regards to the second core commitment of the Cosmopsychist theory, we examine which 
fundamental basis is better equipped to answer the ontological questions we have regarding 
consciousness. According to Kastrup (2018), this commitment divides between whether (i) the 
only fundamental properties of the cosmos are properties of consciousness, from which non-
conscious properties are derived or whether (ii) the cosmos has both the fundamental properties 
of consciousness and then some other fundamental non-conscious properties such as structural 
properties (Kastrup, 2018: p134).   
The first view suggests that the nature of the basic fundamental entity which is the cosmos is 
inherently cosmic phenomenal consciousness. What this implies is that fundamentally, only 
the cosmic consciousness exists as there is nothing outside or independent of it. To put this 
more simply, the cosmos does not contain phenomenality, rather it is completely constituted 
by it (Kastrup, 2018: p135).  
The second view maintains that “a phenomenal ultimate has both phenomenal and non-
phenomenal properties” (Kastrup, 2018: p134). Due to the fact that the cosmos is regarded as 
a whole and the only phenomenal ultimate, this implies that the intrinsic part of the cosmos is 
phenomenal while its extrinsic parts which encapsulate the cosmos phenomenal field are not 
phenomenal. The first view appears to be in alignment with Shani’s theory as he argues that 
everything whether it be conscious or not is derived from the absolute (cosmic consciousness). 
This can be seen in his use of the aquatic metaphors within his theory, as well as in his third 
and fourth postulates which state that the absolute is comprised of a dual nature and that it is 
analogous to a “vast dynamically fluctuating ocean” (Shani, 2015: p411). According to these 
postulates, the absolute which is compared to the ocean is comprised of a dual nature in that it 
possesses a concealed and revealed realm. As we’ve already seen, the concealed realm is an 
intrinsic realm of creative activity which is in a state of continuous change, and the revealed 
realm is the exterior representation of this inner activity. As there is nothing over and above 
the absolute, Shani argues that the revealed realm ought to be thought of as a visible entity to 
observers which is situated and created within the absolute.   
However, Shani is explicit that the distinction between the two realms does not amount to 
ontological dualism as his theory does not imply that there are two distinct realms which 
happen to be sewn together. Rather he argues that there is only one ocean which is an 
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intrinsically sentient medium/sea of consciousness and that this ocean is a powerful entity 
which holds continuous activity that results in the creation of a vast amount of 
“quasiindependent patterns and arrangements that co-evolve in mutual interaction” (Shani, 
2015: p412). Simply put, Shani argues that there is only cosmic consciousness and that 
everything which exists is derived from this consciousness whether it be conscious or not. He 
states in his sixth and final postulates (as well as in the elaborated sections of his theory), that 
individual entities of a physical and mental kind are “dynamic creations within the absolute” 
and that whether or not they are conscious subjects or pure objects depends on the sort of 
causal organization that takes place within them (Shani, 2015: p414/415). In adopting this 
view, Shani manages to avoid a bottom-up Panpsychist element as there appears to be no 
problem of composition due to the fact that everything is created within the cosmic 
consciousness. At this point it is unclear as to what the repercussions might be in adopting 
such a view and perhaps this enquiry is better left for another paper. For now, let us turn our 
attention to our second opponent in order to see which fundamental basis he implements.  
Goff appears to adopt a different fundamental basis compared to Shani, as he implements a 
version of second view, though differs from it in an important way explained below. This can 
be seen in his argument against the anti-subject subsumption conceivability argument in 
section 5.4, where he states that to avoid this particular problem, one would need to include 
some intrinsic nature beyond consciousness into the grounding base (Goff, 2017: p230).   
According to Goff, one would be introducing more intrinsic nature to the cosmos over and 
above what it already possesses in virtue of consciousness. By adding to this intrinsic nature 
one would then change the cosmos’ status from being a pure subject to that of an impure 
subject. This however would not be a view (as suggested by one way of understanding Kastrup 
above), whereby there are two distinct kinds of fundamental properties, experiential and non-
experiential (or phenomenal/conscious and nonphenomenal/conscious) properties, rather the 
experiential and nonexperiential would be two aspects of an underlying fundamental property 
that Goff calls consciousness+. Consciousness+ is a more fundamental underlying property 
that then embodies both experiential aspects as well as nonexperiential aspects into the unity 
of the cosmos.   
Goff acknowledges that this brings with it a cost, in that what generally attracts people to 
Panpsychism is the fact that fundamental reality appears to be transparent, as the only 
fundamental intrinsic properties are experiential. Yet as consciousness+ includes intrinsic non-
experiential aspects to which we then lack access, Goff argues that we lack a broader 
understanding of the deep nature of matter, which is what gives rise to an element of 
noumenalism (though as consciousness+ also has experiential aspects, this noumenalism is 
only partial). What becomes evident here is that this particular theory (which has adopted the 
view that the ultimate has conscious as well as non-conscious aspects) incorporates an element 
of bottom-up Panpsychism to it. Whether this type of fundamental basis is strong enough to 
handle further enquiry and development regarding the ontological questions pertaining to 
consciousness remains to be seen. In what follows we will be comparing Shani’s approach to 
that of Goff’s in an attempt to discern which theory is better at solving the de-combination 
problem, along with which fundamental basis provides a stronger framework from which to 




(5.9) THE BATTLE OF THE COSMOS: SHANI vs. GOFF  
We reach the final stretch where it is time to compare which response to the de-combination 
problem is stronger and which fundamental basis provides the better framework from which 
to develop answers to the mysteries concerning the nature of consciousness. Both begin by 
drawing a distinction between the cosmos and the macro-level subject’s perspectives. Shani 
does this by referring to the cosmos as the absolute and by referring to the macrolevel subject 
as a relative, and Goff makes a similar move by referring to the cosmos as a unity and by 
referring to macro-level subjects as aspects before moving onto their explanations of how these 
perspectives are separate. From this point forward our opponents move in opposite directions 
by taking different approaches to how they separate the above perspectives, along with how 
they tackle the de-combination problem. Shani appears to rely on partial grounding and Goff 
relies on grounding by subsumption. Both theories display advantages as well as 
disadvantages. In what follows we will be addressing each of these in turn, in an attempt to 
determine which of our opponents along with their theories emerge as our victor.  
We begin with the fundamental basis which Shani incorporates into his theory. This states that 
the cosmos is entirely comprised of consciousness and that everything that exists is derived 
from this cosmic consciousness. The question we are then led to ask as a result is: how do 
macro-level subjects and all other subjects obtain their consciousness from this cosmic 
consciousness? Shani relies on the notion of partial grounding to answer this question as he 
states that the absolute’s perspective is only a partial ground for the relative’s perspective. He 
refers to the dual nature of perspectives at this point to clarify how this could be the case.   
If we recall Shani’s previous argument then we will remember that half of a given perspectives 
nature is comprised of a generic character which includes the features of sentience and core-
subjectivity along with unity, and that these features are transferred from the absolute to that 
of the relative. The other half of the perspective’s nature is comprised of a specific character 
of which boundedness is a component. This is where it obtains its individual profile and its 
own unique outlook, which is not derived from the absolute. Shani refers to the latter half of 
the perspectives nature in his argument for why there cannot be compositional relations 
between perspectives. The reason for this is due to the fact that when working with 
perspectives, the introduction of parts appears to exclude the existence of the whole. However, 
as Shani has argued that only half of the perspective is grounded in the absolute, this eliminates 
the clash between the perspectives as the half which contains the unique outlook (along with 
boundedness) has no connection to the absolute whatsoever. What this implies is that there are 
no compositional relations between perspectives and that there is no clash between the 
absolute’s unique outlook and that of the relative’s. By utilizing this fundamental basis along 
with the notion of partial grounding, Shani appears to have found a way to solve the problem 
of de-combination. The above achievement can be viewed as an advantage to accepting this 
type of theory.  
On the other hand, by accepting this theory we appear to be faced with a disadvantage which 
happens to involve the very aspect which aids Shani in the above achievement. As useful as it 
is to have this separated specific character within a perspective’s nature, it seems to come with 
a cost. The very fact that this character has no connection to the absolute is what allows Shani 
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to avoid the problem of de-combination. However, this lack of a connection comes across as 
an element of mystery within Shani’s theory as it is not grounded in the absolute, nor is it 
grounded by other perspectives nor a combination of perspectives. The question that arises as 
a result is: what is this specific character grounded in? No further information was provided 
by Shani with regards to this. All that is known about this specific character is that it arises 
from the internal causal organization that takes place after the relative has separated from the 
absolute and obtained its generic character.   
Shani does not elaborate on what precisely this causal organization entails nor does he offer 
further explanation as to how this half of the perspective arises and how it is grounded. As 
such, we appear to be left with unanswered questions in that only half of the macro-level 
subject’s perspective holds a connection to the absolute, while the other is left hanging in 
limbo, suggesting that all we are really left with is half of a theory.  
In contrast to Shani, Goff takes an alternative approach when it comes to his theory. The 
fundamental basis which he incorporates states that the cosmos is comprised of a property 
called consciousness+ and that this property includes both experiential as well as non-
experiential aspects. Once again this leads us to the question of: how do we ground subjects 
which have their own perspectives in a cosmos subject which possesses its own perspective? 
Goff utilizes what he terms subject-subsumption in order to show us how this could be 
possible. Recall the example of the BIG subject which experiences pain, anxiety and the colour 
red, and how this BIG subject grounds by subsumption subject LITTLE 1 which experiences 
pain, as well as subject LITTLE 2 which experiences anxiety and subject LITTLE 3 which 
experiences red. What this is trying to show us is that each LITTLE subject exists with the 
experience that it has as a result of the fact that the BIG subject exists along with all of its own 
experiences, and that it is possible for these LITTLE subjects to be subsumed within the BIG 
subject. The LITTLE subjects are merely aspects of the larger entity which is the BIG subject 
and are therefore considered to be nothing over and above this BIG subject.  
The advantage in adopting this type of theory is that one is provided with what Goff terms an 
ontological free lunch, which suggests that the nature of an aspect is nothing over and above 
that of the whole precisely because it forms a part of this larger entity. In addition, by obtaining 
this ontological free lunch one no longer needs to provide a deflationary analysis of subjects 
which is in alignment with Goff’s earlier assumption that subjects by nature are irreducible. 
What this means for our opponent is that he is able to completely subsume subjects within the 
conscious cosmos as aspects. This provides one with the opportunity to constitutively ground 
subjects as entire entities in their own right as opposed to our previous opponent (Shani) who 
only partially grounds subjects. Another advantage which follows from this is that by adopting 
this particular grounding relation Goff rejects the traditional form of grounding by analysis, 
which allows him to accept the primary premises of Miller’s argument whilst rejecting the 
inferences which follow. In doing so, Goff manages to provide us with a unique solution to the 
problem of de-combination.   
However, this theory does come with its own disadvantage which happens to concern the 
fundamental basis. With what we’ve previously examined within Goff’s theory, he argues that 
the fundamental basis of the cosmos is constituted of the property known as consciousness+. 
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This property is said to contain conscious (experiential) aspects as well as non-conscious 
(nonexperiential) aspects within it.   
The problem that arises at this point, is that there appears to be a degree of noumenalism about 
fundamental reality according to Goff, as there is an element of mystery with regards to the 
non-conscious aspects. Due to the fact that we lack access to the non-conscious properties of 
consciousness+, this suggests that we will always lack a broad understanding of the intrinsic 
nature of reality (Goff, 2017: p230). Goff concedes that this element of the theory is not 
epistemically ideal, but tries to soften the blow by telling us to keep in mind that physical 
science is only capable of providing us with the causal structures of reality, which suggests 
that we are limited in terms of what it is that we can achieve with regards to unravelling the 
deeper aspects of nature.  
With this in mind we can weigh up the advantages of our opponents theories versus their 
disadvantages. Both opponents fundamental basis appear strong enough to support their 
theories, and both opponents arguments seem strong enough to aid them in their battle against 
the de-combination problem. The advantage of Shani’s theory comes from his use of the partial 
grounding relation in the sense that he’s found a way to ground subjects in a deflationary 
manner. In grounding only the generic character of a specific perspective, Shani manages to 
avoid the clash between the unique outlook of the absolute and that of the relative which 
ultimately allows him to avoid the problem of de-combination. In terms of Goff’s theory the 
advantages are followed by his use of an alternative form of grounding being the grounding 
by subsumption. The first of these advantages is the ontological free lunch which he obtains 
as this allows him to argue that macro-level subjects are nothing over and above the cosmos 
as a whole. What follows from this is the second advantage which is that Goff no longer needs 
to provide a deflationary analysis of subjects, which aligns with his assumption that subjects 
are irreducible. These advantages lead us into the third as subjects are now able to be 
completely subsumed as entities in their own right within the cosmos. From this it appears as 
though the advantages of each theory are relatively strong as they provide the key elements 
required for our opponents to defeat their obstacle. At this point, our opponents then appear to 
be on an equal standing.  
However, as strong as our opponent’s theories seem, there appears to be an element within that 
serves to weaken them both. Within Shani’s theory, the use of a specific character allows him 
to argue that perspectives cannot combine due to this half of the perspective not being 
grounded in the absolute. As such the worry of a de-combination problem is eliminated, thus 
providing him with an advantage. Yet, this key component of Shani’s happens to be his biggest 
disadvantage as well, due to the fact that this component has no grounding relation nor do we 
know how it arises.   
What is implied by this is that half of the perspective mysteriously emerges from the inner 
workings of the generic character. It then seems strange that this half of a perspective that we 
know nothing about acts as the basis within Shani’s theory. This implies that half of the 
relative’s perspective is a mystery due to the fact that it is not grounded in anything, and 
accompanied by the realization that we know very little about it. We then appear to be left with 
only half a solution as half of our ontological question regarding consciousness has been left 
unanswered. The theory thereby seems at best incomplete, at worst, simply ad hoc.   
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With regards to Goff on the other hand, his biggest disadvantage comes from an aspect within 
his fundamental basis which is the notion of consciousness+. This particular aspect along with 
the notion of subject subsumption is what provided our opponent with the tools to tackle the 
argument posed against the anti-subject subsumption conceivability argument. Yet this 
component possesses an air of mystery to it, due to the fact that we know nothing about half 
of its intrinsic nature, which is its nonconscious aspects. The element of the unknown appears 
to be prevalent within both of our opponent’s theories. With Shani this mystery element 
appears in the half of the perspective which is its specific character and with Goff the element 
of mystery appears within the fundamental basis as consciousness+. Without this key element, 
Shani would be unable to solve the de-combination problem. In terms of Goff’s theory, the 
loss of his key component would result in him being unable to solve the conceivability 
argument.    
Considering that both theories appear capable of solving the de-combination problem, it seems 
fair to assume that our competitors are on equal footing. From this alone we are unable to 
determine which of the two theories is stronger. The only way to determine a winner, is to look 
at which of their disadvantages is more acceptable. In terms of Shani’s theory we are faced 
with an uncertainty regarding half of the relative’s perspective. With regards to Goff’s theory, 
we seem to be faced with an uncertainty pertaining to half of the deep nature of reality. So 
which portion of uncertainty are we willing to accept? Which level of uncertainty presents with 
the least amount of damage? With regards to Shani’s theory, his level of uncertainty seems to 
directly impact the relative as half of the relative’s perspective is left unrevealed. Additionally, 
if one were to remove the key element/disadvantage, then it would result in the inability to 
solve the de-combination problem. Goff’s level of uncertainty however does not directly 
impact the relative or its connection to the absolute, but it does impact the cosmos and what 
we know about fundamental reality. The disadvantage accompanying Goff’s theory however 
does not appear to impact his ability to solve the de-combination problem, nor would it result 
in undermining his theory more generally. When formulated in this manner it seems clear that 
Goff’s disadvantage is less damaging than that of Shani’s, in that the element of 
consciousness+ does not directly impact the relative/aspect and its connection, as the half of 
this property which is comprised of consciousness is what grounds the aspect via subsumption.  
It is worth noting that Goff’s theory allows that (theoretically) if one was able to view things 
from a “God’s Eye Perspective” one would have a full explanation of a relative’s conscious 
states and its connection to the absolute, and that the only reason we have this element of 
mystery is due to the fact that we are limited in our perspective. (Goff, 2017).   
 
Additionally, it seems easier to accept that there are aspects of the deep nature of the cosmos 
that we are oblivious to as opposed to being ignorant about our own consciousness. As Goff 
argued within his theory, we have direct access to our own consciousness which suggests that 
we ought to know more about it compared to what it is that we know about the universe. 
Shani’s disadvantage directly impacts the relative as half of the relative’s perspective is 
unaccounted for in terms of what grounds it and how it arises. Trying to accept the idea that 
we don’t know what half of our consciousness is comprised of or what it is grounded in seems 
strange as we have direct access to it and it is more easily studied than the deep nature of the 
cosmos. If indeed half of this perspective relies on emergence then half of the grounding 
75  
  
relation appears to be weaker than that of Goff’s, as his theory allows the entire subject to be 
constitutively grounded within the cosmos. Against the odds and the severity of his 
disadvantage, Goff’s version of Cosmopsychism has managed to emerge as the stronger 
opponent.    
  
(6) THE CONCLUSION OF THE BATTLE     
From the traditional battle between the theories of Physicalism and Dualism, to the 
contemporary battle between two versions of Cosmopsychism, we have managed to gain more 
insight into the ontological mysteries surrounding consciousness. Although we are not where 
we want to be with regards to a complete theoretical explanation of consciousness, we have 
made progress in terms of where we are headed. By moving away from the traditional theories 
of physicalism and dualism we have been able to solve the serious problems which have 
prevented the traditional theories from moving forward, whilst managing to retain the best of 
what each theory had to offer. Although these adaptations of Cosmopsychism are faced with 
problems of their own, they aren’t nearly as debilitated as those of past theories. With what 
we’ve managed to examine up to this point, it appears clear that it is entirely possible for 
philosophers who want to adopt some form of Cosmopsychism to generate solutions to the 
problems which they might face. As with every theory there comes a cost which must be paid 
for at some point.   
Regardless of the fact that both alternative theories examined possess an element of mystery 
to it, we seem able to accept this complication for the time being, as these theories are still 
within the development stages. In terms of the battle that has just taken place, Goff’s theory 
appears to provide us with more advantages than disadvantages, in the sense that we have more 
answers than we do questions. Even though there is a partially mysterious component within 
his theory with regards to the non-conscious aspect of the consciousness+ property, he has still 
managed to provide us with a fundamental basis which supports the notion of constitutively 
grounding conscious subjects within the cosmos via grounding by subsumption. As a result of 
this, he has also managed to obtain an ontological free lunch, thereby securing the elimination 
of the need to provide a deflationary analysis of grounded subjects into more fundamental 
facts. With what we’ve examined thus far, Goff’s theory is the only one that has managed to 
accomplish these feats, which is why this sets his theory apart from the others. Taking all of 
the good and all of the bad into account, it seems safe to say that out of our two competitors, 
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